Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc.
1:18-cv-01689
E.D. Cal.Jan 10, 2020Background:
- Plaintiff Ernesto Limon applied to Circle K, checked that he was willing to submit to a background check, and signed an electronic "FCRA Consent" that included a liability-release clause and a checkbox requesting a copy of the consumer report.
- Circle K obtained Limon’s consumer report on June 28, 2018; Limon received the report and was hired.
- Limon later declared (and testified) he was confused by the FCRA Consent language and did not understand that signing authorized Circle K (and third parties) to obtain his consumer report or waived related rights.
- Limon sued on behalf of a putative class under the FCRA, alleging (1) the written disclosure was not a document that "consists solely of the disclosure," and (2) Circle K lacked valid written authorization to procure the report (15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii)).
- Circle K moved for summary judgment on standing, willfulness, and the authorization claim. The court denied the motion in full.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing | Limon was confused by the FCRA Consent, did not understand he was authorizing a report, yet a report was procured — that concrete informational/privacy injury suffices under Spokeo/Syed | No concrete injury: plaintiff admitted willingness to submit to a background check and therefore lacks the requisite injury | Denied: plaintiff presented evidence of confusion + procurement, creating a concrete injury under Spokeo and Syed; standing established |
| Willfulness under FCRA §1681n | Inclusion of the liability/third‑party release on the disclosure rendered the violation willful because it contravenes the statutory "consists solely" requirement; Syed made the prohibition clear | Even if a violation occurred, it was not willful — Circle K’s reading (that a limited third‑party release is permissible) was reasonable and lacked controlling guidance | Denied: Syed (and statutory text) made the prohibition clear; Circle K’s interpretation was objectively unreasonable and risky after Syed, so willfulness is a jury question |
| Valid written authorization (§1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii)) | Though Limon signed, he credibly alleges confusion such that his signature may not reflect valid authorization | Cunha and similar authority hold a signed form is dispositive — admission of signature defeats the authorization claim | Denied: genuine dispute of material fact exists whether Limon actually authorized the report given his evidence of confusion; summary judgment inappropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (procedural statutory violations require a concrete and particularized injury to satisfy Article III; bare procedural violation may be insufficient)
- Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492 (9th Cir. 2017) (FCRA disclosure must "consist solely of the disclosure"; inclusion of a liability waiver on the disclosure violates §1681b(b)(2)(A) and supports standing; such violations can be willful)
- Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007) (willfulness under the FCRA includes reckless disregard; requires objectively unreasonable statutory interpretation to establish willfulness)
- Nayab v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 942 F.3d 480 (9th Cir. 2019) (recognizing invasion of privacy in consumer credit reports confers standing under FCRA-related theories)
- Cunha v. IntelliCheck, LLC, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (a plaintiff’s admission of signing an authorization form can defeat a §1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) claim where no confusion is alleged)