Limoliner, Inc. v. Dattco, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 969

Limoliner, a bus/coaching company, gave Dattco, a repair shop, a verbal request in 2011 to repair a vehicle inverter; Dattco’s written work order omitted the inverter.
Dattco did not repair the inverter, later declared the vehicle ready, and invoiced Limoliner $10,404; Limoliner refused payment and sought return of the vehicle.
Limoliner sued in Massachusetts Superior Court alleging breach of contract, negligence, replevin, and a Chapter 93A claim that Dattco violated 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 5.05 by failing to record the customer’s specific repair request in writing.
Case removed to federal court; after a bench (jury‑waived) trial the magistrate found breach of contract for Limoliner but rejected the § 5.05 regulatory claim as inapplicable to business‑to‑business transactions.
First Circuit affirmed except it certified the threshold legal question to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court: whether 940 C.M.R. § 5.05 applies when the customer is a business entity.
The SJC held § 5.05 does apply to business customers and answered the certified question “Yes.”

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 940 C.M.R. § 5.05 (requiring repair shops to record customers’ specific repair requests) applies to transactions where the customer is a business entity	§ 5.05 applies to Limoliner because “customer” is defined to include any person or legal entity seeking repairs, and motor‑vehicle regs were promulgated after Chapter 93A was extended to business transactions	§ 5.05 was intended for consumer protection only (as in Knapp); language and examples in the regulation show consumer focus	Held: Yes. The regulation’s definitions ("customer" and "person") include corporations and legal entities; absence of an explicit consumer‑only limitation and placement in motor‑vehicle regs indicates applicability to business customers

Insurance Co. of the State of Pa. v. Great Northern Ins. Co., 473 Mass. 745 (Mass. 2016) (procedure for using lower‑court record when considering certified question)
Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 380 Mass. 762 (Mass. 1980) (Attorney General authorized to identify business practices violating G. L. c. 93A)
Knapp Shoes, Inc. v. Sylvania Shoe Mfg. Corp., 418 Mass. 737 (Mass. 1994) (construing Attorney General regulations and limits of consumer protection scope)
Lease‑It, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 33 Mass. App. Ct. 391 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (material breach excuses further performance)
Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 447 Mass. 651 (Mass. 2006) (inferences when drafting choices are deliberate)
Bishop v. TES Realty Trust, 459 Mass. 9 (Mass. 2011) (interpreting statutory silence regarding distinctions)