449 F.Supp.3d 190
W.D.N.Y.2020Background
- Plaintiff David E. Lilly (pro se), a former USAF staff sergeant, alleges that on Dec. 29, 2014 he was lawfully parked/taking photos at Lewiston parks in a Virginia‑plated pickup when approached by Lewiston officer Scott Stafford.
- At Artpark Stafford ran a license‑plate check on Lilly’s truck (but not other nearby cars), then Lilly drove ~1 mile to the Sand Docks, parked facing the sunset, and began photographing.
- Stafford entered the Sand Docks lot and parked his patrol SUV at a 90° angle directly in front of Lilly’s truck, blocking it against an embankment; Stafford remained and questioned Lilly for ~10–15 minutes.
- Lilly alleges the blocking and prolonged questioning amounted to an unlawful seizure and retaliation in violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments and brings § 1983 claims against Stafford, Chief Christopher Salada, and the Town of Lewiston.
- Procedurally: after an earlier dismissal with leave to replead, Lilly filed an Amended Complaint; Defendants moved to dismiss. The court dismissed all claims with prejudice except Lilly’s Fourth Amendment claim against Stafford, which survives; claims against Lewiston and Salada were dismissed and any state‑law claims were found not pleaded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fourth Amendment — Was Lilly seized when Stafford boxed his truck in? | Lilly: Stafford’s SUV blocked my truck at a 90° angle, boxing me in for 10–15 minutes, so a seizure occurred. | Defs: The encounter was consensual; blocking a car alone does not necessarily create a seizure. | Court: At pleading stage, allegations plausibly show a seizure; claim against Stafford survives. |
| Fourth Amendment — Did Stafford have reasonable suspicion / was the stop’s scope/duration reasonable? | Lilly: Facts (out‑of‑state plates, locations, timing) do not show criminality; questioning exceeded a brief inquiry. | Defs: Prior pleadings suggested facts supporting suspicion; even if a stop, it was a lawful Terry stop. | Court: Under totality, alleged facts do not establish reasonable suspicion as a matter of law and the 10–15 minute questioning may be unreasonable; cannot resolve now — claim survives. |
| First Amendment retaliation | Lilly: (asserts retaliation) | Defs: No protected activity alleged that would motivate retaliation. | Court: Dismissed — plaintiff did not plead protected speech or causal motivation. |
| Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process | Lilly: alleges a due process violation separate from Fourth Amendment. | Defs: The Fourth Amendment governs seizure claims. | Court: Dismissed — no independent Fourteenth Amendment claim; Fourth Amendment framework controls. |
| Municipal / supervisory liability (Lewiston, Salada) | Lilly: alleges department practices, prior lawsuits, and knowledge re: K‑9 Taser. | Defs: No municipal custom/policy alleged; no personal involvement by Salada. | Court: Dismissed — complaints about isolated incidents and bare allegations of lawsuits insufficient for Monell; no personal involvement pled as to Salada. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must state a plausible claim for relief)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plaintiff must plead that each government‑official defendant, through the official’s own actions, violated the Constitution)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (officer may briefly stop and investigate upon reasonable suspicion)
- Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (consensual encounters vs. seizures: no seizure if a reasonable person would feel free to leave)
- United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (reasonable suspicion standard evaluated under the totality of the circumstances)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (presence in a high‑crime area alone does not create reasonable suspicion)
- Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000) (factors identifying a seizure include show of authority, retention of ID, tone, physical touching)
- Pane v. Gramaglia, [citation="509 F. App'x 101"] (2d Cir. 2013) (blocking a parked car with a marked police car and spotlight can constitute a seizure)
- Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires unconstitutional action pursuant to official policy or custom)
- Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (identity inquiries during Terry stops are routine and permissible)