Liff v. Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Labor, Civil Action No. 2014-1162

Background

Plaintiff Stewart Liff, a former federal employee turned government consultant, worked for DOL and OPM but was the subject of OIG investigations and reports in 2011 that led to publicity and loss of government clients and contracts.
Liff sued agencies (procedural-due-process and APA claims) and individual officers (Bivens damages for procedural-due-process violations).
On a prior motion to dismiss the court allowed Liff’s stigma-plus procedural-due-process claims to proceed and deferred ruling on whether a one-year (defamation) or three-year (residual personal-injury) statute of limitations governed the Bivens claim.
Defendants moved for reconsideration of the limitations issue; the court treated the motion under Rule 54(b) and reconsidered the timeliness question.
The key legal question was whether Doe v. DOJ’s application of D.C. Code § 12‑301(4)’s one‑year limit for defamation extends to stigma‑plus Bivens claims that rest on internal non‑publication actions (blacklisting) as well as on public defamatory statements.
The court held that Doe’s one‑year rule applies to reputation‑plus claims and stigma‑plus claims based on defamation, but not to stigma‑plus claims that rest on non‑defamatory, internal exclusionary actions; part of Liff’s Bivens claim thus remains timely under the three‑year residual period.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Which statute of limitations applies to Liff’s Bivens stigma‑plus claim?	Liff: Owens/Wilson require borrowing the D.C. residual three‑year personal‑injury period.	Defendants: Doe controls and a one‑year D.C. defamation period applies.	Court: Three‑year residual applies to stigma‑plus claims not based on defamation; Doe’s one‑year rule limited to defamation‑based reputation claims.
Does Doe v. DOJ remain binding in Bivens cases after Owens?	Liff: Owens supersedes narrow pre‑Owens borrowing; three‑year residual governs.	Defendants: Doe remains good law and binds courts to one‑year for these claims.	Court: Doe remains binding for defamation‑based claims but must be narrowly applied; reconcile Doe with Owens by limiting Doe’s reach.
Does a stigma‑plus claim require defamatory publication to third parties?	Liff: Stigma‑plus does not require publication; internal exclusion/blacklisting can trigger due‑process injury.	Defendants: Liff’s allegations are effectively defamation‑based stigma and thus governed by Doe.	Court: Stigma‑plus can be founded on internal, non‑published actions; such claims are not necessarily defamation‑based.
Is reconsideration under Rule 54(b) appropriate?	Defendants: Court should resolve limitations question now.	Liff: Prior decision left the question open; reconsideration not necessary.	Court: Reconsideration under Rule 54(b) appropriate and granted in part to resolve timeliness issue.

Key Cases Cited

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (recognition of implied damages action against federal officers for constitutional violations)
Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (state residual personal‑injury statute governs § 1983 claims when multiple periods exist)
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (use of state statute of limitations analogies for federal civil rights claims discouraged in favor of broad characterization)
Doe v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir.) (applied D.C. one‑year defamation limitations to constitutionally based defamation action)
Banks v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1416 (D.C. Cir.) (recognized one‑year rule for constitutional torts listed in § 12‑301(4))
Kartseva v. Department of State, 37 F.3d 1524 (D.C. Cir.) (stigma‑plus claim can arise from internal government memoranda and disqualification from government work)
O’Donnell v. Barry, 148 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir.) (differentiation of reputation‑plus and stigma‑plus due‑process theories)
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (reputation alone not a liberty interest triggering due process)