Lia Lingo v. City of Salem
832 F.3d 953
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- On June 13, 2010, Salem police officers Elmore and Carney responded to a neighbor dispute; at Lingo’s back door the officers smelled a marijuana-like odor.
- Lingo refused consent to a search; officers arrested her for child endangerment under Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.575 after confirming she had minor children in the home and lacked medical-marijuana privileges.
- After the arrest the police obtained a warrant, searched the house, and found bongs, ~1.8 grams of marijuana, packaging, and some prescription pills.
- At trial Lingo moved to suppress the search evidence; the trial court granted suppression and the criminal charges were dropped.
- Lingo then sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and interference with familial association; the district court found the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when entering the curtilage but held the exclusionary rule does not apply in § 1983 cases and granted summary judgment for defendants based on probable cause.
- On appeal Lingo challenges only the validity of her arrest, arguing (1) evidence from the unlawful curtilage approach cannot establish probable cause, and (2) the facts did not support probable cause even if unlawfully obtained evidence were considered.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the exclusionary rule (fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree) applies in a § 1983 suit so officers cannot rely on unlawfully obtained evidence to show probable cause | Lingo: evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful entry into curtilage cannot be used to justify arrest | Officers/City: exclusionary rule is a criminal-trial evidentiary remedy and should not bar defendants in a civil § 1983 defense | Court: exclusionary rule does not apply in § 1983 civil suits; officers may rely on unlawfully obtained evidence to defend against a tort claim |
| Whether the Fourth Amendment bars an arrest justified solely by evidence discovered via an unlawful search | Lingo: use of such evidence renders arrest tainted and invalid | Defendants: Fourth Amendment wrong is the unlawful search itself; using discovered evidence does not create a new constitutional violation | Court: use of fruits of an unlawful search does not itself violate the Constitution; probable cause may be based on information regardless of admissibility |
| Whether officers had probable cause to arrest Lingo for child endangerment (allowing minors to remain where controlled-substance activity occurs) | Lingo: facts at the scene (and later small amount of marijuana found) do not establish probable cause; questions about veracity of odor claim | Defendants: officers smelled marijuana, were trained to detect it, Lingo admitted the aroma (hemp incense), and records showed no medical-marijuana privileges—together supplying probable cause | Court: affirmed probable cause—odor, presence of children, and lack of medical authorization gave a prudent person a fair probability of the offense |
| Whether any municipal liability claim barred summary judgment (related but not challenged on appeal) | Lingo: alleged city liability for officers’ actions | City: argued no basis for municipal liability | Court: district court concluded Lingo did not demonstrate municipal liability; appeal did not contest that ruling |
Key Cases Cited
- Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (establishing exclusionary rule and fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (exclusionary rule social costs and limits; use of evidence does not itself violate Fourth Amendment)
- United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (distinguishing intra- and intersovereign civil applications of exclusionary rule)
- United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (exclusionary rule is an evidentiary, not personal, constitutional right)
- Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (exclusionary rule is prudential and limited outside criminal trials)
- Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (suppression is last resort; social costs of exclusionary rule)
- Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406 (probable cause depends on information known, not admissibility)
- Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138 (civil § 1983 context; exclusionary rule would overdeter police)
- Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259 (exclusionary rule not applied in § 1983; officers may rely on unlawfully obtained evidence to prove probable cause)