Lewis v. People, 261 P.3d 480

Lewis was charged with multiple kidnapping and sexual-assault offenses arising from three separate incidents involving three underage girls, with each incident involving isolating the victim, threats or weapons, and forceful sexual acts.
The jury found 24 counts proven, and Lewis was sentenced to more than 700 years of incarceration after convictions for sexual assault and second-degree kidnapping (elevated to class two felonies when sexual assault was involved).
On direct appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, including the separate sexual assault and class-two-felony kidnapping convictions, and rejected Lewis’s merger arguments.
The defense challenged Henderson’s ruling that sexual assault and second-degree kidnapping could be punished separately, arguing that Apprendi and Blakely require a different result.
The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether Henderson should be overruled in light of Apprendi and Blakely, while acknowledging these decisions do not undermine legislative intent in Henderson.
The court ultimately affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the legislature’s drafting distinctions between elements and sentencing factors and the statutory framework allow separate convictions and punishments for sexual assault and second-degree kidnapping.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Henderson should be overruled in light of Apprendi and Blakely	Lewis argues Apprendi/Blakely undermine Henderson’s merger rationale.	People contends Henderson remains valid despite Apprendi/Blakely for this statutory scheme.	Henderson is not overruled; statutory merger framework upheld.
Whether the legislature's use of sentencing factors versus elements affects merger	Lewis asserts the distinction voids separate punishment for sexual assault and kidnapping.	People maintains the distinction reflects legislative intent to authorize separate punishments.	Legislature intended separate convictions; merger not required under §18-1-408.
Whether the double jeopardy/merger analysis requires treating the offenses as the same for purposes of both jeopardy and punishment	Lewis contends later Supreme Court decisions foreclose separate punishments.	People asserts state-law drafting controls and allows cumulative punishments when authorized.	State statute permits separate punishments; no constitutional bar to multiple convictions.
Whether the statutory structure of §18-3-302 and §18-3-301 supports class-two kidnapping with a sexual-assault enhancement	Lewis argues inclusion would merge the offenses under §18-1-408.	People argues the structure uses enhancement within an offense, not an element, avoiding merger.	Statutory drafting supports distinct offenses; no merger required.

People v. Henderson, 810 P.2d 1058 (Colo.1991) (established merger approach and element/sentencing-factor distinction in Colorado)
Powell v. People, 716 P.2d 1096 (Colo.1986) (legislature may structure enhancements without merging offenses)
Haymaker v. People, 716 P.2d 110 (Colo.1986) (early articulation of strict elements/merger framework)
Armintrout v. People, 864 P.2d 576 (Colo.1993) (merger and statutory treatment of multiple convictions)
Garcia v. People, 940 P.2d 357 (Colo.1997) (limits on multiple convictions within single proceeding)
Leske v. People, 957 P.2d 1030 (Colo.1998) (merger considerations under Colorado law)
Meads v. People, 78 P.3d 290 (Colo.2003) (statutory merger and elements-based analysis reinforced)
Abiodun v. People, 111 P.3d 462 (Colo.2005) (further application of merger principles under §18-1-408)
Boulies v. People, 770 P.2d 1274 (Colo.1989) (precedent on merger and elements-based approach)