908 F. Supp. 2d 313
E.D.N.Y.2012Background
- Plaintiff Crystal D. Lewis began NYPD employment in 1980 as a Police Aide with a rotating clerical assignment.
- Plaintiff was terminated on October 22, 2007, after a 2006–2007 disciplinary cycle; restored to duty after NYC Civil Service modification in 2008, then dismissed again on November 13, 2009.
- Plaintiff’s FMLA leave requests were approved in 2003–2004 but later limited by an hour threshold and hours worked, with 1,250-hour eligibility determinations occurring in 2004.
- Plaintiff filed an OEEO complaint in March–April 2004 and a subsequent complaint in June 2009 alleging disability harassment; OEEO findings exonerated Dozier in 2004; 2009 complaint led to investigations not resulting in action.
- Plaintiff filed a May 5, 2005 EEOC charge alleging disability and age discrimination and retaliation; a separate 2008 EEOC charge related to later events.
- Court grants summary judgment for Defendants on multiple grounds, including untimeliness, non-suability of NYPD, and lack of evidence of discriminatory pretext.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of Title VII/ADA/EEOC claims | Lewis exhausted via EEOC charges but may rely on later events. | Claims untimely under 300-day/90-day rules and Morgan timeline. | Untimely; claims outside 300-day window and late termination challenges barred. |
| FMLA interference timeliness | Denials of FMLA leave during 2004–2007 were improper. | FMLA claims outside 2-year/3-year window; willful will not rescue timeliness. | FMLA interference claim untimely (two-year limit applied; willfulness did not extend). |
| ADA discrimination and reasonable accommodation | Excessive absences due to disability could be accommodated. | Plaintiff not otherwise qualified due to chronic absenteeism; requested accommodations did not negate essential functions. | No genuine issue; Plaintiff not otherwise qualified; judgment for Defendants on ADA/retaliation and Title VII claims. |
| Title VII discrimination/retaliation | Discriminatory treatment based on disability and reverse discrimination; retaliation for FMLA activity. | No evidence of discriminatory motive or proper causation; legitimate non-discriminatory reasons shown. | Summary judgment for Defendants on Title VII and ADA retaliation claims. |
| NYPD as a suable entity and individual capacity of Kelly | NYPD suable; Kelly individually potentially liable under ADA. | NYPD not suable; no individual-capacity ADA claim against Kelly. | NYPD not suable; ADA claim against Kelly in his individual capacity barred. |
Key Cases Cited
- National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (U.S. 2002) (discrete acts time-bar rules; 300-day/limitations framework)
- Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487 (2d Cir. 2009) (prima facie Title VII discrimination framework)
- Lyons v. Legal Aid Society, 68 F.3d 1512 (2d Cir. 1995) (ADA 'otherwise qualified' concept; reasonable accommodation limits)
- Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1991) (reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate essential functions)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)