Levin v. United States
133 S. Ct. 1224
| SCOTUS | 2013Background
- Levin, a veteran, sued the United States after cataract surgery at a U.S. Naval Hospital in Guam, claiming medical battery for withdrawing consent before surgery.
- District Court substituted the United States as defendant, dismissing the battery claim under the FTCA’s intentional tort exception §2680(h) after treating the surgeon as acting within scope of employment.
- Levin argued that the Gonzalez Act, especially §1089(e), nullified the FTCA’s §2680(h) exception for medical battery by military personnel.
- Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal, reading §1089(e) as supporting immunity for malpractice claims but not waiving the intentional tort exception for battery against the United States.
- This Court granted certiorari to resolve whether §1089(e) abrogates the FTCA’s intentional tort exception and permits a battery claim against the United States.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does §1089(e) abrogate the FTCA §2680(h) intentional tort exception for medical battery claims? | Levin: §1089(e) unambiguously removes §2680(h) for medical battery. | Gonzalez Act only shields personnel and confines abrogation to those within listed agencies. | Abrogates; battery claims may proceed against the United States. |
| How does §1089(e) interact with the Liability Reform Act (Westfall Act)? | Gonzalez Act remains operative; Smith supports broader access to battery claims. | Liability Reform Act would supersede Gonzalez Act except for indemnification scenarios abroad. | Gonzalez Act language abrogates the FTCA exception despite Liability Reform Act concerns. |
| Is §1089(e) language distinct from VA §7316(f) wording to affect immunity scope? | VA §7316(f) mirrors §1089(e) and supports waiving immunity for battery. | VA language is not dispositively different; cannot interpret §1089(e) as limited. | No decisive distinction; §1089(e) governs here and abrogates §2680(h). |
Key Cases Cited
- Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990) (plain-language interpretation of statutory text)
- United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985) (FTCA and intentional tort framework)
- United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160 (1991) (Liability Reform Act treated as exclusive remedy; Gonzalez Act function)
- Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002) (statutory interpretation principle on legislative drafts)
- Franklin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1492 (1993) (comparative analysis of VA-like immunity provisions)