Leveen v. United States
21-1658
| Fed. Cl. | Oct 29, 2021Background
- Plaintiff Lindsay Leveen, a pro se chemical engineer, alleges he was the tipster to the EPA and other federal agencies about Bloom Energy's mishandling of hazardous materials and provided hundreds of documents and hundreds of hours of assistance.
- He claims his information prompted a multi-year EPA investigation and a $1,360,000 fine, and seeks a 30% whistleblower award (~$411,000).
- Plaintiff filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims after the EPA did not grant an award; he later filed an amended complaint adding punitive damages and referencing additional agencies.
- The United States moved to dismiss under RCFC 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing the court lacks Tucker Act jurisdiction because plaintiff failed to identify any statute or contract creating a right to money damages.
- Plaintiff did not identify a legal source for a whistleblower award in response; he made non-legal arguments (e.g., thermodynamic principles) and requested expedited handling.
- The court held a hearing and dismissed the action without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Court of Federal Claims has Tucker Act jurisdiction to award a whistleblower payment | Leveen: his tip produced a penalty and therefore entitles him to a whistleblower award (30% of fine) | U.S.: No statutory or contractual source identified; Tucker Act requires a separate money‑mandating source | Dismissed for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction; plaintiff failed to identify a substantive source of law or contract |
| Whether pro se status permits relaxation of jurisdictional pleading requirements | Leveen: as pro se, should receive leniency and the court should proceed quickly | U.S.: Jurisdictional requirements cannot be relaxed for pro se litigants | Court declined to relax jurisdictional jurisdictional requirements; pro se leniency does not alter Tucker Act prerequisites |
| Whether the amended complaint cured jurisdictional defects (e.g., added punitive damages, more agencies) | Leveen: amended pleading and additional agency references support his claim | U.S.: Amendments do not supply a money‑mandating source | Amendment did not cure lack of a substantive legal basis; dismissal stands |
Key Cases Cited
- Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law creating a right to money damages to invoke Tucker Act jurisdiction)
- United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (U.S. 1983) (Tucker Act does not create substantive rights; separate source required)
- United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (U.S. 1976) (same principle that a money‑mandating source is required for claims against the United States)
- Jan’s Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Federal Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (failure to identify a money‑mandating source requires dismissal for lack of jurisdiction)
- Greenlee Cty. v. United States, 487 F.3d 871 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (jurisdictional dismissal appropriate when Tucker Act prerequisites are unmet)
- Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (plaintiff bears the burden to establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence)
- Lewis v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 682 (Fed. Cl. 2014) (Tucker Act requires a separate source of substantive law to state a viable claim)
- Meidinger v. United States, 146 Fed. Cl. 491 (Fed. Cl. 2020) (discusses implied‑in‑fact contract theory as a basis for Tucker Act jurisdiction)