Leslie Coleman v. United States
912 F.3d 824
| 5th Cir. | 2019Background
- Coleman, a former Air Force member, sued the VA under the FTCA alleging medical malpractice (lap-band treatment and related surgeries), Privacy Act violations, discrimination, and intentional torts; district court granted summary judgment or dismissed most claims.
- Coleman proffered two medical experts; one was struck for discovery failures and the other (Dr. Flancbaum) was struck by the district court for failing to meet Texas’s statutory "practicing medicine" requirement for expert witnesses.
- The district court concluded that Federal Rule of Evidence 601 required applying Texas competency rules for expert witnesses in FTCA medical malpractice suits governed by state substantive law.
- The court dismissed some privacy-related claims for failure to exhaust FTCA administrative remedies and granted summary judgment on Privacy Act claims for lack of proven pecuniary harm and lack of willfulness.
- The district court treated Coleman’s assault/battery claim as jurisdictionally barred under an FTCA exception but the Fifth Circuit held the FTCA exception did not apply to VA medical-care claims; nonetheless summary judgment on the merits was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fed. R. Evid. 601 requires applying state expert-competency rules in FTCA medical-malpractice suits | Coleman: Federal Rule 702 governs expert admissibility; state competency rule is procedural and inapplicable. | Government: Rule 601’s second sentence imports state competency rules where state law supplies the rule of decision. | Court held Rule 601 requires applying state expert-competency rules (so expert must satisfy both state competency and Rule 702). |
| Whether Dr. Flancbaum was "practicing medicine" under Texas law (qualification) | Coleman: Disputed; Dr. Flancbaum met Texas practice or should be excused under §74.401(d) for "good reason." | Government: He was not practicing medicine during relevant times and thus incompetent under Texas statute. | Court vacated district court’s finding that it was undisputed he wasn’t practicing and remanded to decide competency and possible §74.401(d) exception. |
| Whether privacy-related claims requiring FTCA exhaustion were properly dismissed | Coleman: Government waived exhaustion defense or claims were properly before court. | Government: FTCA exhaustion is jurisdictional and not waivable. | Court affirmed dismissal of privacy-related FTCA claims not administratively exhausted and modified analysis to clarify Privacy Act claims cannot be brought through FTCA. |
| Whether summary judgment for government on Privacy Act and assault/battery claims was proper | Coleman: Genuine issues of material fact exist; harms and willfulness are present. | Government: Coleman produced no evidence of proven pecuniary harm or willfulness; assault/battery lacked supporting evidence. | Court affirmed summary judgment on Privacy Act claims for lack of pecuniary harm and willfulness, and affirmed summary judgment on assault/battery on the merits (though not jurisdictionally barred). |
Key Cases Cited
- Legg v. Chopra, 286 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2002) (State expert-competency statute applied in federal malpractice action under Rule 601)
- McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2004) (Rule 601 incorporates state competency rules for expert witnesses in state-law malpractice suits)
- Liebsack v. United States, 731 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2013) (state statute limiting who may testify to standard of care is substantive and applied via Rule 601)
- Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (state law governs substantive issues in federal court)
- McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993) (FTCA administrative exhaustion is jurisdictional)