Les Helgeson v. Tillamook County, 679 F. App'x 628

Background

Plaintiff Les Helgeson sought relief after county sheriffs acted to restrict or remove his Concealed Handgun License (CHL) based on a perceived public-safety risk; he later obtained a new CHL through state appeals.
Helgeson asserted substantive due process and equal protection (class-of-one) claims against Tillamook County and two sheriffs; he abandoned his Second Amendment claim and waived any procedural due process claim.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants; Helgeson appealed.
Defendants defended their actions as discretionary law-enforcement decisions taken to protect the public and authorized by Oregon law.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed whether (1) defendants’ conduct was constitutionally arbitrary under substantive due process and (2) a class-of-one equal protection claim could lie given discretionary, individualized executive decisionmaking.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether defendants’ actions violated substantive due process by abusing executive power	Helgeson argued the sheriffs’ actions were constitutionally arbitrary and an abuse of power lacking reasonable justification	Defendants argued their actions were reasonable, based on available information and aimed at legitimate public-safety objectives under state law	Affirmed for defendants: plaintiff failed to meet the "exceedingly high burden" to show constitutionally arbitrary action
Whether Helgeson had a protected property or liberty interest in his CHL sufficient for substantive due process	Helgeson contended he had a cognizable property/liberty interest	Defendants disputed existence or sufficiency; court found decision unnecessary but noted plaintiff did not prevail even assuming an interest	Court held plaintiff did not show arbitrary conduct; summary judgment warranted
Whether sheriffs personally participated in or caused unequal treatment for equal protection purposes	Helgeson argued he was singled out as a class-of-one	Defendants argued no personal participation by sheriffs and no similarly situated comparators	Held for defendants: no evidence of personal participation and plaintiff failed to identify similarly situated persons
Whether a class-of-one equal protection claim can challenge discretionary, subjective executive decisions	Helgeson sought relief under class-of-one theory	Defendants argued Engquist bars class-of-one claims when decisions involve subjective individualized assessments	Held for defendants: Engquist precludes class-of-one challenge to discretionary law-enforcement decisions

Key Cases Cited

Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2008) (explains the high burden to show executive action is constitutionally arbitrary)
Matsuda v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 512 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2008) (substantive due process standards for executive action)
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (abuse-of-power standard and legitimate governmental objectives)
Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2002) (requirement of personal participation for §1983 liability)
Gerhart v. Lake Cty., 637 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2011) (standard for identifying similarly situated individuals in equal protection claims)
Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing treatment of dissimilar groups in equal protection analysis)
Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (bars class-of-one claims based on discretionary, subjective governmental decisions)
Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (context for plaintiff’s decision not to pursue a Second Amendment claim)