Leroy Gipson v. the State of Texas, 09-19-00275-CR

In August 2018, Leroy Gipson stabbed Roderick Wiltz in the chest inside a barber shop; Wiltz died days later from the wound.
Gipson admitted to stabbing Wiltz with a knife and acknowledged the knife could cause death; the jury found the knife was a deadly weapon.
Gipson testified he was tired of being bullied, said Wiltz had slapped him and threatened him, and claimed he did not intend to kill Wiltz and hoped Wiltz would not die.
After the stabbing Gipson left the scene immediately and did not render aid; he later expressed remorse and told police "Ain’t no man going to slap me."
A jury convicted Gipson of murder (first-degree); Gipson pleaded true to enhancements increasing his punishment range; he appealed arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove he acted intentionally or knowingly and that the trial court erred in denying his instructed-verdict motion.
The Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the combined circumstantial evidence supported a rational jury finding Gipson acted intentionally or knowingly.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence to prove Gipson acted intentionally or knowingly in causing Wiltz’s death	State: circumstantial evidence (use of deadly weapon, flight, motive/retaliation, admissions) permits a rational jury to infer intent/knowledge	Gipson: he did not want to kill Wiltz; expressed remorse; claimed fear and bullying; asserted lack of intent	Affirmed — evidence (deadly-weapon use, flight, prior threats/retaliation, Gipson’s awareness that stabbing could kill) was sufficient for a rational jury to find intent/knowledge
Denial of Gipson’s motion for instructed verdict (directed verdict)	State: denial proper because evidence raised fact questions for the jury	Gipson: same insufficiency grounds — trial court should have instructed verdict for acquittal	Affirmed — trial court did not abuse discretion in denying the motion
Credibility of Gipson’s statements of remorse and denial of intent	State: jury may disbelieve portions of Gipson’s testimony; credibility is for the factfinder	Gipson: remorse and his statements to detective show lack of intent/knowledge	Held for State — jury reasonably rejected or limited weight of Gipson’s exculpatory statements and could infer intent/knowledge

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence)
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (sufficiency review and circumstantial evidence treated like direct evidence)
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (deference to jury fact findings where multiple reasonable inferences exist)
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (consider cumulative force of all evidence)
Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (definition of a hypothetically correct jury charge for sufficiency review)
Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (use of deadly weapon can support inference of intent to kill)
Gonzalez v. State, 616 S.W.3d 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (consideration of surrounding circumstances to infer intent)
Blankenship v. State, 780 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1989) (factfinder’s role in weighing evidence and credibility)