Leonard Wilson v. Meijer Great Lakes Limited Partnership
349078
| Mich. Ct. App. | Jul 1, 2021Background
- Claimant Leonard Wilson, a Meijer store team member, missed scheduled shifts five consecutive workdays (Sept 4–8, 2017).
- He called Meijer once on Sept 5 after his shift start time, explaining he was in jail on a narcotics charge; Meijer did not accept collect calls and the call was deemed a courtesy, not timely notice.
- Meijer’s attendance policy required notice at least 60 minutes before shift start and provided for termination after three consecutive no-call/no-show days; Wilson was terminated after three such days.
- Wilson applied for unemployment benefits; an ALJ disqualified him under MCL 421.29(1)(a)’s "no show, no call" sentence, the MCAC affirmed, and the circuit court affirmed that decision.
- The appeal asked whether the third sentence of MCL 421.29(1)(a) requires case-by-case factual consideration or whether the statute conclusively treats a 3-day no-call/no-show as a voluntary quit without good cause.
Issues
| Issue | Wilson's Argument | Meijer/UISA's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the third sentence of MCL 421.29(1)(a) is ambiguous and requires factual inquiry into voluntariness | The statutory phrase should be read with the presumption in the second sentence and analyzed case-by-case (relying on Lyons/Warren); Wilson urged a factual inquiry into why he failed to appear | The statute unambiguously declares that an employee absent 3 consecutive workdays without contacting employer in an acceptable manner "shall be considered" to have voluntarily left without good cause—no further factual inquiry | The court held the language is clear: the statute conclusively classifies a 3-day no-call/no-show as a voluntary quit without good cause (no case-by-case consideration) |
| Whether pre-2011 precedent (Lyons, Warren) controls interpretation of the statutory "no show, no call" rule | Lyons/Warren define voluntariness and require factual analysis; Wilson argued they should apply | Meijer/UISA: Those cases predate the 2011 statutory amendment that created a statutory circumstance amounting to voluntary leaving as a matter of law | The court held Lyons and Warren do not control because the Legislature added the dispositive third sentence in 2011, changing the law |
| Whether the statute creates an improper "strict liability" or conflicts with the Act’s remedial purpose | Wilson argued the provision effectively shifts burden and creates an absolute bar inconsistent with remedial goals; urged liberal construction | Meijer/UISA: The plain statutory language controls despite remedial purposes; exceptions to benefits can be created by the Legislature | The court held remedial purpose does not override clear statutory text; the statute creates an absolute legal classification for the described circumstance |
| Whether the third sentence should be construed as a rebuttable presumption rather than conclusive classification | Wilson argued the second-sentence presumption should extend to third-sentence cases | Meijer/UISA: The third sentence contains no presumption language and uses mandatory "shall be considered," so it is conclusive | The court held there is no presumption in the third sentence; the statute mandates classification as a voluntary quit without good cause |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Mich, 482 Mich 90 (court reviews agency statutory construction de novo)
- In re Reliability Plans of Electric Utilities for 2017-2021, 505 Mich 97 (statutory interpretation begins with plain language)
- Browder v. Int’l Fidelity Ins. Co., 413 Mich 603 ("shall" indicates mandatory directive)
- Lyons v. Appeal Bd. of Mich. Employment Security Comm., 363 Mich 201 (1961) (earlier definition of "voluntary" leaving; pre-amendment precedent)
- Warren v. Caro Community Hosp., 457 Mich 361 (1998) (two-part inquiry on voluntariness and good cause; pre-amendment)
- Tomei v. Gen. Motors Corp., 194 Mich App 180 (1992) (pre-amendment voluntariness analysis)
- Carswell v. Share House, Inc., 151 Mich App 392 (1986) (definition of good cause benchmark)
- Empire Iron Mining Partnership v. Orhanen, 455 Mich 410 (1997) (remedial statutes interpreted to effect legislative intent but not to override clear statutory exceptions)
- Lash v. City of Traverse City, 479 Mich 180 (2007) (courts cannot rewrite clear legislative choices)