Lennox v. City of Sacramento
2:21-cv-02075
| E.D. Cal. | Aug 16, 2024Background
- On Dec. 13, 2020 Jordan Zenka entered a Sacramento supermarket with a serrated bread knife, cut himself, and remained in the produce/bakery area while officers gathered; about 20–22 officers ultimately responded.
- SPD Captain Hunkapiller arrived, formed a "contact team," and authorized an "overwhelming less-lethal" advance; he declined a proposal to include a long-range taser and did not designate a taser officer.
- As officers advanced, multiple officers fired less-lethal munitions (beanbags and 40mm rounds) and Officer Tsverov deployed a taser; shortly thereafter CHP Officer Simpson and SPD Officer Pinola fired lethal rounds that struck Zenka; distance at shooting disputed (~7–15 ft).
- Video evidence does not clearly show whether the taser or the gunshots caused Zenka’s fall; after he fell, officers tased and fired additional less-lethal rounds while he remained wounded and holding the knife, and Zenka later died.
- Plaintiff (Mary Lennox, successor) alleges federal §1983 excessive force (Fourth Amendment), deliberate indifference to medical needs, substantive due process (Fourteenth), Monell claims (municipal ratification/failure to train), state-law battery/negligence (wrongful death/survival), and Bane Act violations; city and state filed partial summary judgment motions.
- Ruling summary: the court denied the state defendants’ partial summary judgment and granted-in-part/denied-in-part the city defendants’ motion — chiefly: Tsverov’s first taser deployment (before Zenka fell) was reasonable as a matter of law (summary judgment for Tsverov as to that use), City’s Monell failure-to-train claim was dismissed, but triable issues remain as to lethal force by Simpson/Pinola and other less-lethal/continued-force uses; supervisory liability and most federal and state claims survive summary adjudication.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excessive force (Fourth Amendment) — lethal and less-lethal uses | Officers used excessive and unreasonable force on a mentally disturbed person, failed to use less intrusive options (tasers, K-9), and gave no warning | Use of force was objectively reasonable given perceived threat; qualified immunity applies | Summary judgment denied for most officers; Tsverov’s initial taser (pre-fall) ruled reasonable as matter of law; triable issues remain for Simpson, Pinola, and others (lethal shots and post-fall force) |
| Substantive due process (Fourteenth) | Killing/deprivation of familial relationship was conscience-shocking or showed deliberate indifference | Officers acted under exigent/snap-judgment circumstances or without intent to harm | Summary judgment denied as to most defendants; Tsverov’s initial taser claim dismissed; jury must resolve whether deliberate indifference or purpose-to-harm standard applies |
| Monell — failure to train (City) | City training/policy was inadequate (warnings, de-escalation, taser use), and policy violations show defective training | City training meets standards; single incident insufficient to show deliberate indifference under Connick/Harris | Summary judgment granted for City on failure-to-train Monell claim (no pattern or "patently obvious" single-incident liability shown) |
| State-law torts and statutory immunities (battery, negligence; Penal Code §§196, 835a; Gov’t Code §820.2) | State torts parallel federal claims; officers not immune because force may have been unreasonable | Simpson asserts justifiable homicide/peace-officer privileges and discretionary immunity | Summary judgment denied on immunity grounds; factual disputes preclude finding §196/835a or §820.2 immunity; state claims survive except those predicated solely on Tsverov’s first taser deployment |
| Bane Act (Cal. Civ. Code §52.1) — specific intent | Officers acted with reckless/disregarding intent to deprive rights (Bane Act requires specific intent or reckless disregard) | No specific intent to deprive constitutional rights | Summary judgment denied; triable issues exist on reckless-disregard/specific intent except for claims based only on Tsverov’s initial taser (dismissed) |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (objective-reasonableness standard for Fourth Amendment use-of-force)
- Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805 (taser in dart mode is intermediate significant force)
- Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (use-of-force factors and taser law)
- Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (less-lethal projectiles can cause serious injury; Graham factors applied)
- Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024 (shooting mentally unstable, outnumbered subject where less-lethal options available creates triable issue)
- Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864 (use of beanbag/less-lethal against mentally ill subject may be excessive)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (deadly force to prevent escape is unreasonable unless immediate threat or serious risk)
- Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100 (qualified immunity analysis; distinguishable facts)
- Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (Monell failure-to-train requires deliberate indifference; single-incident liability rare)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (municipal liability for inadequate training requires deliberate indifference)
- Zion v. County of Orange, 874 F.3d 1072 (force continued after suspect incapacitated may be unreasonable)
- Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131 (Fourteenth Amendment conscience-shocking standards: deliberate indifference vs. purpose-to-harm)