Leidig v. State, 256 A.3d 870

Background

In Sept. 2016 police swabbed suspected blood from the Browns’ broken window and curtain; samples were sent to the Maryland State Police lab.
Forensic scientist Molly Rollo analyzed the scene swabs, prepared a signed laboratory report concluding the swabs contained blood and yielded a single-male DNA profile; the report noted validation to FBI Quality Assurance Standards and was entered into CODIS, producing a hit to James Leidig.
Another analyst, Tiffany Keener, tested Leidig’s reference sample, compared her profile to Rollo’s profile, and testified at trial; Rollo, though subpoenaed, did not testify and her report was admitted into evidence.
Leidig was convicted on several counts; he appealed arguing admission of Rollo’s report and Keener’s relay of Rollo’s results violated his confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
The Court of Appeals assumed the Sixth Amendment result unclear, adopted an independent Article 21 standard: a scientific report is “testimonial” if a reasonable declarant would have understood its primary purpose was to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
Applying that Article 21 test, the Court held Rollo’s report was testimonial and its admission (and Keener’s testimony relaying it) without Rollo subject to cross-examination violated Leidig’s Article 21 rights; reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Issues

Issue	Leidig's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether admission of a non-testifying analyst’s lab report (and another analyst’s testimony about it) violated confrontation rights	Rollo’s report is testimonial and Leidig was entitled to confront Rollo; admission without cross-examination violated Sixth Amendment and Article 21	Report lacks necessary formality/accusatory character to be "testimonial" under Supreme Court precedents; Keener’s administrative/peer review justified relay testimony	Under Article 21, the report was testimonial (declarant would reasonably expect the report to be used prosecutorially); admission without Rollo for cross-examination violated Article 21; new trial ordered
Which standard governs "testimonial" for Article 21 challenges to forensic reports	Apply Davis primary-purpose test (or broader state protection) so many lab reports are testimonial	Continue to read Article 21 consistent with Supreme Court’s fractured Williams framework (formality/accusatory tests)	Maryland adopts an Article 21 test based on objective primary purpose: a scientific report is testimonial if a reasonable declarant would understand its primary purpose was to establish past events potentially relevant to prosecution
Whether Keener’s role as administrative reviewer allowed her to introduce Rollo’s report	Administrative review is insufficient; only the actual analyst or a technical reviewer who personally reviewed/testing can be surrogate witness	Keener reviewed and initialed the report and was qualified to testify; Rule 5-703 permits an expert to rely on such documents	The Court distinguished administrative vs technical review: Keener was only an administrative reviewer, not a sufficient surrogate; testimonial material required the declarant (or technical reviewer) to be available
Whether Maryland should follow federal Sixth Amendment tests (post-Williams) or apply independent state standard under Article 21	State constitutional protection can be broader; adopt independent Article 21 standard to avoid Williams gridlock	Continue to interpret Article 21 in pari materia with the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by Supreme Court	Court: adopt independent Article 21 standard (primary-purpose objective test) and resolve case on that state-ground basis; decline to leave resolution to fractured federal precedent

Key Cases Cited

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (establishes Confrontation Clause focus on testimonial hearsay; absent witness must be unavailable and previously cross-examined)
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (articulates objective "primary purpose" test for when statements to police are testimonial)
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (forensic certificates were testimonial; analysts who prepared them must testify)
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) (prosecutor may not introduce lab report through a surrogate who did not perform or observe the testing)
Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (fractured opinions produced competing tests—accusatory, formality, and evidentiary-purpose approaches—creating uncertainty)
Derr v. State, 422 Md. 211 (2011) (Derr I) (Maryland Court initially held admission through surrogate analyst violated Confrontation Clause)
Derr v. State, 434 Md. 88 (2013) (Derr II) (on remand, Maryland declined to adopt an independent state test and applied a formality-based reading of Williams)
State v. Norton, 443 Md. 517 (2015) (adopted a two-track approach from Williams: report testimonial if formal or accusatory; applied to certify certain DNA reports as testimonial)
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (incorporation of Sixth Amendment confrontation right against the states)