672 F.Supp.3d 1165
W.D. Okla.2023Background
- Plaintiff Stacey Leichliter sent a certified letter on Jan. 27, 2021, stating she refused to pay an alleged Capital One (Kohl’s) debt and demanded cessation of communication under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c).
- Defendant Optio Solutions, LLC (d/b/a Qualia Collection Services) sent collection communications to Leichliter after receiving that letter.
- Leichliter sued under the FDCPA § 1692c(c) seeking actual and statutory damages for continued communications.
- Optio moved for summary judgment arguing (1) Leichliter lacks Article III standing and (2) it is protected by the bona fide error defense under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).
- Leichliter moved for partial summary judgment on liability; she submitted testimony of emotional distress manifesting as migraines and a declaration from her mother corroborating harm.
- The court found genuine disputes of material fact on standing (both tangible—migraines—and intangible—intrusion-on-seclusion analog) and on the second and third prongs of the bona fide error defense, and therefore denied both summary judgment motions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing (injury-in-fact) for §1692c(c) claim | Receipt of post-notice communications caused emotional distress (migraines) and an intrusion-on-seclusion–analog injury. | Plaintiff's alleged emotional harms are not concrete (no medical treatment); a statutory violation alone is insufficient; a single letter is less intrusive than calls/texts. | Court: Plaintiff has standing—record shows tangible harm (migraines) and an intangible harm analogous to intrusion upon seclusion. |
| Whether a single unwanted letter can give rise to a concrete privacy-type injury under §1692c(c) | §1692c(c) can elevate a single communication to a concrete injury because its text explicitly bars further communication after written notice. | Cites Perez: Congress did not elevate a single-letter receipt to a legally cognizable injury under other FDCPA provisions. | Court: Relied on Lupia and other district decisions; §1692c(c)’s text and purpose support treating a single post-notice communication as potentially concrete. |
| Bona fide error defense (intent, bona fide error, procedures) | Argues Optio cannot show the violation resulted from a bona fide error or that it maintained reasonably adapted procedures. | Optio does not dispute lack of intent but asserts the violation was an unintentional bona fide error and that it maintains procedures reasonably adapted to avoid this error. | Court: Genuine issues of material fact exist as to the second and third prongs (bona fide error and adequacy of procedures); defense unresolved on summary judgment. |
| Disposition of cross-motions for summary judgment | N/A | N/A | Court: Denied both Optio’s motion and Leichliter’s partial motion for summary judgment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lupia v. Medicredit, Inc., 8 F.4th 1184 (10th Cir. 2021) (holding unwanted post-notice communications can bear a close relationship to intrusion-upon-seclusion and support standing under §1692c(c))
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (U.S. 2016) (framework for injury-in-fact: concrete and particularized)
- TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (U.S. 2021) (intangible harms are concrete if closely related to traditional common-law harms)
- Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 2020) (texts/calls can be concrete harms in kind, not degree, relative to intrusion-on-seclusion)
- Perez v. McCreary, Veselka, Bragg & Allen, P.C., 45 F.4th 816 (5th Cir. 2022) (single unwanted letter did not confer standing under the FDCPA provision at issue there; court distinguished that analysis)
- Johnson v. Riddle, 443 F.3d 723 (10th Cir. 2006) (elements and burden for FDCPA bona fide error affirmative defense)
- Caputo v. Professional Recovery Servs., Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (D. Kan. 2003) (definition and inquiry for bona fide error and objectively reasonable procedures)