Legette v. United States, 2013 D.C. App. LEXIS 375

Background

Ronnie Legette was tried and convicted of armed first-degree sexual abuse, kidnapping while armed, armed robbery, felony threats, possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, and possession of a firearm by a felon based principally on J.S.’s May 14, 2006 account of a forcible sexual assault at gunpoint. A DNA "cold hit" linked Legette to biological material from J.S.’s rectal swab.
The government introduced testimony from J.W., who testified about a separate 2000 armed sexual assault by Legette with very similar circumstances (approach of a lone person waiting for transport, threats of a gun, transport to an abandoned location, forcible sex). A juvenile court previously found Legette responsible for that 2000 assault.
Legette’s defense from the start was consent: defense counsel argued in opening that the encounter with J.S. was consensual anal sex and that J.S. later falsely accused Legette after revealing she is anatomically male. Defense called a witness to suggest J.S. had bragged about getting someone "locked up."
The trial court admitted J.W.’s testimony as other-crimes evidence under Drew exceptions (intent and motive), after finding intent genuinely at issue because Legette raised consent. The court instructed the jury that the prior-act evidence could be used to decide whether Legette had a "motive and/or intent" to have sexual contact with J.S. by force.
On appeal Legette challenged admission of J.W.’s testimony as impermissible propensity evidence; the D.C. Court of Appeals concluded the evidence was admissible to prove intent (non-propensity purpose) but the jury instruction inviting use as "motive" evidence was erroneous. The court found the error harmless and affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Government)	Defendant's Argument (Legette)	Held
Admissibility of prior sexual-assault testimony under Drew intent exception	Prior conduct is relevant to rebut consent defense by proving defendant’s intent to use force	Prior act only shows propensity to commit sexual offenses; not probative of consent issue here	Admissible: defendant’s consent defense placed intent to use force in genuine dispute; prior act probative of intent apart from propensity
Use of prior-act evidence as motive evidence	Motive instruction helps show plan/intent to force sex	Motive instruction permits impermissible propensity inference because victims were different	Use as "motive" for attacking this specific victim was improper; instruction risked propensity inference
Prejudice vs. probative value under Rule 403 balancing	Evidence highly probative (similar MO, prior finding of responsibility, limited alternative proof); prejudice does not substantially outweigh probative value	Admission would inflame jury and improperly encourage conviction based on bad character	Probative value (intent) was very high; any added prejudice from erroneous motive framing was marginal; admission harmless error
Sufficiency of limiting instruction to cure potential misuse	Limiting instruction confined use to motive/intent and forbade character inference	Limiting instruction was inadequate because it allowed "motive" broadly and invited propensity inference	Limiting instruction was flawed (permitted motive use), but error was harmless given legitimate intent purpose and balancing

Key Cases Cited

Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (establishes other-crimes rule and recognized exceptions: motive, intent, absence of mistake, common scheme, identity)
Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414 (D.C. 1988) (framework for evaluating Drew intent exception and jury instructions)
Crisafi v. United States, 383 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1978) (prior sexual offense admissible to show intent when consent is disputed)
Calaway v. United States, 408 A.2d 1220 (D.C. 1979) (other-sexual-assault evidence admissible where similar modus operandi supports intent/identity; erroneous motive use was harmless)
Dyson v. United States, 848 A.2d 603 (D.C. 2004) (admission of related incidents permissible where similarities bear on intent to have sexual contact and consent is disputed)
Roper v. United States, 564 A.2d 726 (D.C. 1989) (elements for admitting other-crimes evidence: clear-and-convincing proof of prior act, relevance to genuine contested issue, non-propensity logical relevance, and Rule 403 balancing)
Harrison v. United States, 30 A.3d 169 (D.C. 2011) (motive exception cannot be used to show generalized sexual desire; such use impermissibly invites propensity inference)
Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087 (D.C. 1996) (adopts Rule 403 substantial-prejudice balancing standard and deference to trial judge s assessment)
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (U.S. 1946) (harmless error standard: conviction stands if error did not substantially influence jury)