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Roper v. United States
564 A.2d 726
D.C.
1989
Check Treatment

*2 MACK, Before FERREN and STEADMAN, Judges. Associate

PER CURIAM: Roper, Appellant, Jack A. robbery, D.C. indictment with armed (1981 -3202 &

Code §§ carrying Supp.), (1981). (CDW), He D.C.Code § acquitted on jury was tried before guilty robbery charge found but appeal, Roper asserts of CDW. On be reversed be- should his CDW conviction impermissibly charges were cause two Super.Ct.Crim.R. violation replace ask evening Under of this for time circumstances agree. chain. government called the stand

The Sergeant Metropoli- Vincent Tolson of the I. Department. Sergeant tan Police Tolson governmеnt introduced evidence day, testified that next December tending forcibly show *3 1987, he went to the Reeves at 2000 Center gold complaining stolen a chain from the Street, get a At 14th N.W. to shoe shine. witness, Dyneesha Johnson. Johnson testi- a.m., approximately he the 9:00 entered evening fied of December appeared and what to men’s room noticed 1987, Roper, someone she had known for a handle of nine millimeter semiau- be the years, arranged few called her and to come protruding pocket from pistol tomatic the Although her to house. could not re- she the of a tan coat on floor of one of the Roper member the exact time that had the Sergeant Tolson looked under stalls. arrived, it Johnson estimated stall saw feet of inside. and someone Johnson, p.m. According 10:00 or 10:30 He left the men’s room and radioed then Roper parked his car across the street from re- for assistance. uniformed officers Two horn; and Johnson’s home honked sponded, police ar- and the three officers house, her over Johnson left walked to the appellant They the stall. re- rested inside car, got and in. Johnson stated that the gun jacket pocket.1 BB covered a from approximately two for talked five-to-ten in his behalf at Appellant testified own sitting Roper minutes while in the car. voluntar- trial. He stated that Johnson had give gold then asked her to him the neck- her ily lent him chain when she discovered wearing. initially she lace Johnson broken, that his own necklace wаs but that then, said, thought joking, he was she but he traded chain cocaine. later for her, pulled gun, it Roper pointed out a mother discovered When and her Johnson again demanded the necklace. John- missing, appellant testi- that the chain was complied, this point son testified that at she fied, angry. they very Concerned became removing handing Rop- the ehain and made Johnson had about threats Constance back her er. She then went into house and him, gun pocket placed he BB in his her Roрer told mother that had taken the stated, day, protection.2 for the next he mother, ‍​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‍Johnson, necklace. Her Constance trial, filed a motion appellant she looked out the window Prior to testified that indictment, pursu- running street, up the sever the counts in the Roper and saw leav- 8(a) 14.3 The Super.Ct.Crim.R. ing his car Constance Johnson fur- ant to behind. appellant phoned trial court denied this motion. ther stated that later that trial, 8(a) governs joinder of of gun initial At 3.Rule 1. Johnson identified recovered single appellant appellant from as similar to the one where there is fenses in an indictment allegedly (in to rob her. She had used testified there are two or cases where gun square, defendants, in the had been the dark, used of Rule the narrower dictates more large and "medium or size.” She was 8(b) regardless govern, of whether the issue however, impeached, previous statement offenses). joinder joinder or of defendants gun police made had been small. she (D.C. Ray 472 A.2d v. United 1984). 8(a) provides as Rule follоws: Appellant gave explanation a similar of his may be or more Two police the BB reason separate same indictment or information arrested him at the Reeves Center. officers who charged, if the offenses count for each offense however, statement, suppressed by the This misdemeanors, both, or whether felonies or court taken in of Miranda trial violation are or are of the same or similar character Arizona, L.Ed.2d 384 U.S. S.Ct. or on act or transaction based on the same (1966), thus could be admitted connected or more acts or transactions two impeachment if he took witness constituting parts together common or of a York, v. New 401 U.S. stand. See Harris plan. or scheme (1971). Appellant has S.Ct. 28 L.Ed.2d contrast, governs where severed, situations Rule argued charges he joined properly Rule trial, under the offenses are CDW have testified at the joinder potential prejudice from where the but not have been used thus statement could great sufficiently is none- thаt severance against him. of crimes.”4 Winestock

II. addition, (D.C.1981). 429 A.2d 8(a), multiple Under Rule has means posited one court “similar” together only tried the of be “ resembling ‘[njearly corresponding; same or charac fenses similar alike; having a many respects; somewhat ter; (2) are on the same or trans based act ” v. Wer United States general likeness.’ action; more acts are based two or ner, (2d Cir.1980) (quot together con or transactions connected ing Dictio New International stituting parts of a cоmmon Webster’s scheme nary supra (2d ed.)). plan. Empirically, note 3. Whether offenses have, rule, properly permitted join- under is a can Rule 8 courts as a law, question of and our sim review the “same or der of offenses Joyner matter is thus novo. de provision only where there is a sub ilar” (D.C.1988); Ray, 540 A.2d degree similarity among the stantial supra charged.5 find no such substan crimes *4 similarity in the present tial instant government argument The rests its indeed, how, and, using any we fail to properly in this case were definition, the two offenses аt reasonable 8(a) joined solely provision of Rule same issue here could construed as “the be joinder allows for of offenses “of the which or similar.” interpret- same or similar character.” In provision, re- ing largely courts have robbery is in this Armed defined lied on common-sense definitions of ... jurisdiction “by force or violence as Thus, or term “same similar.” we ac tak[ing] person from the or immediate suggested that offenses are of or the same possession anything of val tual of another similar character in the counts general dangerous dead- “allege indictment the same kinds while armed a or ue” with Werner, justified. supra, Ray, type"); supra, F.2d at theless 472 A.2d at 856. "of the same 620 Thus, (two requirements foreign currency if and if the of Rule 8 and of thefts of 926-27 currency met, go (from respectively) are court on consider the jewelry, a to and same provisions of cargo airport Rule 14. building defen in which appeal, appellant On renews his claims both dant in each case acted as "inside master-mind” join- prejudicial character, 8 and of under Rule even of the or similar were same der under Rule 14. Because find the of- we though different offenses were under 8, misjoined were fenses violation of Rule while and one theft involved violence statutes do not reach his Rule 14 contention. States, not); other did and Drew v. United 85, App.D.C. 331 F.2d 87 118 U.S. Super.Ct.Crim.R. is identical to FED.R. 8 (robbery robbery attempted stores in of two Accordingly, CRIM.P. 8. to feder- look chain, apart, of were same two-and-a-half weeks per- al court construction federal rule character) v. States same similar United authority interpreting rule. suasive our local 422, Cir.1978) (2d Halper, 590 F.2d 431 supra, Joyner, at 459 v. 540 A.2d n. Settles (Medicaid not of income tax evasion fraud and States, 348, (D.C.1987). 522 A.2d 352 n. 6 United though both same similar character even government alleged, charges, defen involved Winestock, Compare, e.g., supra, A.2d at 429 causing in employees to false his submit dant (two 524-25 armed robberies which occurred agencies); government United to formation only a few within one hour of each other and 411, Cir.1974) Graci, (3d v. F.2d 412 States 504 sufficiently apart similar to war blocks found (sale government property, of stolen States, joinder); 385 rant Samuels v. United drugs, happened of property and crime 16, (D.C.1978) (two of 18 armed robberies A.2d delivery drugs the same were not offenses of women, approximately pair of cab drivers a character). See also Blunt or similar apart, similar seven hours were same or 311, 306, States, App.D.C. F.2d 404 131 U.S. character); States, Bridges A.2d 381 uttering (forging checks (D.C.1977) (four rapes, committed charаcter,” fraud same checks offenses "of city period of months and same area involving over six checking money wiring from same based on operandi of same same were modus character"; robbery denied, "of initial character), account similar similar cert. checkbook, nor (1978); same neither S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 141 United offenses), de (8th cert. Rodgers, as other similar character v. 732 F.2d 629-30 States Cir.1984) nied, (distribution S.Ct. 22 L.Ed.2d posses 394 U.S. of cocaine and (1969). sion of cocaine with intent distribute ly weapon. anything particu- D.C.Codе -3202 Nor is there about §§ lar of the crimes at issue here that (1981 facts Supp.). gravamen & 1988 offenses, leads to believe these two us offense is something is taken from a abstract, which are dissimilar v. See Ellis United person force. in this particular similar as manifested (D.C.1978) (“The case.7 The first incident involved the al- purpose armed statute is to theft, leged gunpoint, gold of a chain protect being unwillingly individuals from acquaintance, from an while the second deprived personal through property of their possеssion of a BB involved force.”). contrast, the use of public Despite govern- restroom.8 dangerous weapon consists of arguments con- ment’s strenuous to the “carrypng] openly either ‍​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‍or concealed on or trary, simply suffi- these crimes are deadly person any about ... or dan- [one’s] joinder Rule ciently justify similar gerous weapon capable of so con- (1981). cealed.” It is D.C.Code § essentially possession, designed crime of III. keep such items off improperly Where offenses hаve been See Scott v. street. “presump under Rule there (D.C.1968) (noting Congression- A.2d possibility prejudice tive the defen “drastically tighten al intent ban dant.” Morris United carrying dangerous weapons”). The basic (quoting King v. (D.C.1988) natures the offenses are thus dissimilar. States, (1st Cir. *5 only The fact that the two crimes share a Nevertheless, 1966)). held that we have single possession deadly aof or misjoinder may where be harmless error element — dangerous weapon this conclu- the of substantially “all or all of evidence —reinforces sеp- in a sion.6 would be admissible [one offense] (1) robbery government argues 6.The elements of armed are: that that these offenses property some possession, the defendant took of value from the that involves and similar in each complainant against will of use, the plainant; the the com- dangerous weapon. potential use a or of (2) possession the that defendant took misjoinder As court another commented a violence, by property of such force or whether case, consider of the "we this characterization resistance, by against stealthy or or sudden sei- entirely charged nature of essential the snatching, complain- putting or or the zure joint Halper, too a trial. broad” warrant fear; (3) posses- that the defendant took ant accept supra the note 590 F.2d at 430. To property person or of from the imme- sion such government’s all would mean that contention that, (4) complainant; the after diate actual of armed, burglaries committеd from crimes while having property, so the the defendant taken murders, could, theoretically, joined as (5) away; it that the defendant took carried offenses, or however differ- "the same similar" away right property carried it without such and they might ent be. We believe otherwise it; specific do so intent to steal and and with contemplation beyond of Rule 8. result to be the that, (6) time of commission of the at the the with, offense, the defendant was armed or had as an assertion of 7. We note availаble, dangerous deadly readily weapon a or indictment, alleges a defect in the under Rule 8 including pistol pis- (specifically or imitation similarity appropriately is most the of offenses tol). Jury the Instructions for District Criminal by the of the indictment. content determined Columbia, (3d 1978). 4.61 4.03 ed. Nos. & States, supra, 429 A.2d See v. United Winestock deadly carrying danger- or The elements cases, Here, as the indictment at in most carried, (1) defendant ous are: alleges facts about skeletal per- openly about either sоn, or concealed on or his dangerous crimes. any deadly weapon capable or concealed; (2) that the so to do the acts which constitute great had intent government places emphasis on the 8. The deadly dangerous weapon; gun may have been involved fact that the same (3) purpose carrying the instru- and assuming was there offenses. Even both deadly use as a ment its involved, that the same clear evidence government, is weapon; not re- do not believe this supra see note specif- quired prove had a that the defendant for similar to make these two crimes sufficient unlawfully. intent use the instrument ic purposes of Rule Instructions, Jury No. 4.81. Criminal

731 1989); Thompson, supra, Ray, supra, 420; arate of the A.2d at trial other.”9 472 546 States, Byrd, supra accord Graves 859; A.2d A.2d at note 99; Settles, supra (D.C.1986); (3) the evidence must be 551 A.2d ‍​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‍at note prove this issue for a logically A.2d at 354. relevant power other than its to demonstrate reason determining In whether evidence Landrum, supra, propensity, criminal аlleged armed would be 1326; Ali, supra, 520 A.2d at 310 A.2d at charge, admissible trial CDW States, n.4; Campbell 450 A.2d Drew, supra we look to (D.C.1982); (4) the evidence progeny.10 strong possibili Because of the prejudicial, probative more than must be ty unduly preju the defendant will be e.g., Thompson, supra, A.2d diced introduction “other crimes” supra, 450 A.2d at 430. Campbell, Drew evidence, prohibits the use such States, generally Bartley v. United except evidence admitted where (D.C.1987) (Mack, J., dis- A.2d substantia], legitimate “some purpose.” law, conclude, senting). We as а matter of App. 331 F.2d U.S. D.C. 89- acquitted appellant Drew, applying dictates robbery charge, there was not clear pointed specific out requirements have four convincing evidence that for the admission of other crimes evidence: offense, and the first committed other convincing there must be clear and evi requirement admissibility was therefore dence that the defendant committed not met. Thompson offense, other (D.C.1988); requiring n.11 The reason for there be v.Ali United convincing 520 A.2d 310 & clear еvidence that the de- Bussey, (D.C.1987); United States v. n.4 in fact other fendant committed the offense App. if D.C. should else commit- be obvious: someone (1970); crime, other crimes ted if no crime was commit- ted, genuine, must be directed ato material and evidence of the other offense would Landrum v. time, issue in contested no relevance —and at the same (D.C. might seriously prejudice the defendant. *6 so, admissibility might 9.While mutual of offenses has situation where this stance, not be for in- principal gauging been our standard for harm wоuld be in a case where the defendant offense, misjoinder, less testify error where there mutual wishes to as to one but does not admissibility precisely testify charges is not coextensive with wish to as to another. If the instance, suggest harmlessness. For ‍​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‍it has been separately, testify tried he could choose to misjoinder may If, ed doing that be harmless where trial without so in the second. on first govern guilt presented by hand, the evidence of charges the other the two were tried to- overwhelming. Byrd defendant, ment is gether, desiring testify as 96, Settles, 4, (1988); supra offense, 551 99 n. 8 "may testifying be into the first coerced 522 A.2d at 356 n. see also States v. United upon which to remain on the count he wished 725, Lane, 438, 449-50, 474 U.S. 106 S.Ct. 732- App.D.C. U.S. silent.” Cross v. United 324, 118 33, (1986) (holding misjoin- 987, L.Ed.2d 814 that (1964). 88 poten- 335 F.2d 989 only requires der reversal where it "results in may prejudice thus suffer for tial prejudice it actual injurious because ‘had substantial having together tried rather than determining effect or influence in apart regardless of the evidence exists whether jury’s (quoting v. Kotteakos verdict."’ in a of crime have been admissible each would 66 U.S. S.Ct. 90 328 trial of other. (1946)). clearly We note that this is L.Ed. 1557 appellant acquitted rob- not the case here. of the armed As charge, bery not whether we need determine token, however, By may same there be appellant's would have CDWoffense evidence in circumstances two offenses would separate in a trial for armed been admissible admissible, mutually but be where the error still robbery. cannot be considered harmless. While it has mutually that offenses are ad- said missible, be admitted to сrimes evidence trying Other "there be no can harm motive, intent, (3) (2) successively, the absence together show be- rather than accident, (4) a jury common scheme all mistake plan, cause in either event the will hear about Drew, crimes,” identity. supra, 118 U.S. Ray, supra, both 472 A.2d at this fact, may, App.D.C. at F.2d at 90. not be true in all cases. One Bartley, (Mack, Nonetheless, supra, See 530 A.2d at 701 able find doubt standard. J., unfair, dissenting); disturbing, fundamentally it J. Weinstein, Evidence 11404[10], (1989). acquitted that one could be of a crime 404-69 Where the de trier-of-fact, has, trial, yet prior.to have it held that fendant been convicted that charge offense, issue, course, evidence of that same would have of the other this against arise, been admissible him in another trial. does not for a al trier-of-fact has Peters, Daily C v. United States ready beyond a determined reasonable f. (D.C. Wash.L.Rptr. Super. Ct. Dec. guilty doubt defendant is of the 31, 1975), appendix In re set Thompson, other crime. supra, See forth A.W., (D.C.1976) 695 n. 22 hand, A.2d at 421 n. 11. On the other (Nebeker, J., concurring) (suggesting that defendant, trial, prеvious where the in a other, “unseemly” for a court to re would be acquitted offense, has been probation voke offense basis of an number of courts have held that evidence acquit probationer of which the had been that offense cannot be used at trial. (citation omitted)). therefore, hold, ted Keller, E.g., United v. 624 F.2d States mis- that where two or more offenses are (3d Cir.1980) (evidence inadmissible under Rule and the defendant estoppel); doctrine of collateral offenses, acquittеd of those of one Mespoulede, United States v. F.2d cannot, misjoinder theory at least under a (2d Cir.1979) (same); United States v. admissibility, harml mutual held to be Day, App.D.C. 192 U.S. ess.12 (1978) (same). F.2d But (8th Riley, States find the Accordingly, we Cir.1982) (rejecting analysis), cert. de offenses in this case to be error. reversible nied, 103 S.Ct. Reversed and remanded. (1983).

L.Ed.2d 962 generally J. ¶ 404[10], Weinstein, at 404-74 to MACK, Evidence Judge, concurring: Associate (1989). -75 join opinion. I I fully the court’s that I would add also believe explicitly This court has never evidence is not rele- we, Nor reached lаtter issue. prove vant to carried a dan- today, until had occasion decide the re gerous beyond power gener- acquittal question lated of whether propensity ate an and so fails inference jointly necessarily one or two tried offenses requirement meet the third for admissi- that the offense of which the defen means bility. at 731. See ante acquitted dant was have been offense, long standing the other “It is in our admissible trial on a principle precludes any improper of onе is inadmissi- and thus Rule 8 law crime *7 recog disposition to to commit joinder prove from harmless. We ble States, guilt beyond a reasonable is crime....” v. United nize that doubt Drew higher proof App.D.C. than is clear and U.S. F.2d a standard of evidence, thus, (emphasis original). “pro- This convincing it is not in in so-called consistent, designed a pensity in find that is to insure that theory, to there is rule” only he is that convicted because convincing clear and evidence an indi defendant is charged guilty crime and not be- a crime where the individ vidual committed using engaged he in other crimi- acquitted has been the reason- cause have ual not, provisions the of Rule It should clear that we in this 12. case, only im- examining where the offenses were acquittal’s pro- decide that an effect on the properly joined initially, that this priety joinder in this of the initial case. See if defendant cannot be held harmless the generally 8 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE , acquitted (2d of one of the crimes. 1989) (discussing retroactive ed. ¶ 8.06[3] misjoinder), ap- Similarly, therein. of what and cases cited Had we do not reach the issue guilty impact, acquittal our pellant any, of both in this would have on been found if an case, changed analysis a trial court abused its would the fact that of whether has not have denying Rule 14. properly in severance under could not have been discretion these two offenses probative of the defendant’s activity, Thompson as nal see admissible (D.C.1988); problem pointing In out the with A.2d Unit intent. Myers, 550 F.2d argument, ed States v. concluded: this (5th Cir.1977) (“a defendant be tried must the is no connection between There real did, is”). he for who for what he allegation the that other than to thought rule is thus to be fundamental spring from the defendant’s they both presumption guaranteed the of innocence marijuana and to sell predisposition criminal defendants. all Landrum Indeed, logically draw one cannot P.C.P. (D.C. the two incidents connection between a 1989); Thompson, supra, 546 A.2d assuming first because without Campbell No- to sell in Thompson predisposed was (D.C.1982). predisposed he so vember remained Herе, government the that evi- contends Here, April piggy-backs intent in ‍​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‍robbery dence of the armed be rele- predisposition. vant in the trial to intent or CDW show (citation omitted).1 Id. at supra, in Thompson, motive. We noted government the present In the cases, many difficult that in “it is a statute notes that violation CDW the impossible to differentiate between carrying requires purpose that “the predisposition to do to intent an act and a dan- deadly use as instrument it,” explained that do A.2d at as- weapon,” ante gerous prior can be- evidence of crimes “[w]here BB appellant’s alleged use of the serts that respect probative come with to intent robbery evening gun to commit a be- has predisposition after inference intend tends to show that did fore drawn, argument been for admission gun weapon. as a For to use weakest, at its for the distinction between to appellant’s be relevant armed and predisposition intent then becomes gun day, in purpose carrying the next ephemеral.” Thompson, Id. at however, requires precisely the-inference (having passenger the defendant been the predisposition that admonished twenty-seven packets in a car which is, against in that because Thompson: marijuana P.C.P.-laced were found beneath BB a gun intended seat) Roper to use passenger charged pos- with he intend- weapon on one occasion that session of with in- a controlled substance distribute, government weapon the BB as a on a and the as- еd to use tent nothing subsequent This can be had occasion.2 serted evidence marijuana propensity argument.3 previously and P.C.P. was but a sold 2. 1. There peatedly to the ample, Thompson out crimes evidence dant’s tent, mission narcotics possession to distribute. than drugs Indeed, gleaned nine hours earlier? night [T]he 421-22. any for apartment as relevant before. What individual inference of are, reason App.D.C. his or her from what defendants a controlled substance with theory prosecutor more Thеre, jury: may be why course, cites who likely personal predisposition. he has the court He used he had the guns did he simply possessed relevant cases argued F.2d 1062 found person dealing use. this use States v. in which upheld defendant’s in this such for an unlaw- See 546 A.2d in the defen gun gun intent theory (1986), As weapons for Payne, an ex *8 illegal intent other with for ad re- 3. minded rule," must I note weapon. The be. He what fore, hours ful He admits Dyneesha Johnson. sha Johnson. weapon. [HJis looks like Secondly, “be alert to purpose, and should unlawful mаnner. to rob he did intent with this ****** [******] modes of evasion before already counsel that courts n apt Thompson Isn’t it it. He was dangerous as to the to rob Dyneesha use sophisticated as well as next weapon "view with had used strange, somebody, day gun weapon was shown going to Johnson. carrying He had used it to he’s found with that was used lo and for nine it in robbery. He’s jaundiced use it a behold, rob propensity dangerous hours be- simple- if need Dynee- point. just this rob eye I can see proper purpose Because no for alleged

which evidence of the armed rob- introduced,

bery could have I been reason,

hold that for this as for as well court, opinion

those set forth for the Drew, the evidence would have inadmissible for separate trial being so, agree

CDW. This I

misjoinder was not harmless. WRIGHT, Appellant,

Robert STATES, Appellee.

UNITED

No. 82-733. Appeals.

District of Columbia Court

Argued Nov. 1988. Sept.

Decided Gorfkle, appointed L.

Judith court, appellant. Fine, Atty., A.

Glenn Asst. U.S. Atty., Jay B. Stephens, whom Farrell, Atty. Michael at the W. Asst. U.S. brief, filed, the brief was were on time appellee. FERREN, Before NEWMAN and GALLAGHER, Judges, Associate Judge. Senior GALLAGHER, Judge: Senior degree first appellant of juryA convicted armed, 22- burglary while D.C. Code §§ (1981), 1801(a) (Supp.1988), three 22-3202 robbery, 22-2901 of armed id. counts §§ armed, 22-3202, (1981), rape while id. (1981), 22-3202, sodomy, id. 22-2801 §§ (1981), forgery, id. § § Appellant uttering, id. 22-1401. § rape while arm- the convictions for contests sodomy contending that the trial ed predisposition." primarily purportedly as relevant defendant’s offered wholly reality bearing *9 546 A.2d at other issue but in some

Case Details

Case Name: Roper v. United States
Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Date Published: Sep 26, 1989
Citation: 564 A.2d 726
Docket Number: 88-411
Court Abbreviation: D.C.
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