LEFTWICH v. STATE
2015 OK CR 5
Okla. Crim. App.2015Background
- Deborah Leftwich, a sitting Oklahoma state senator, was convicted by bench trial under 26 O.S. § 16-108 for soliciting/accepting something of value to withdraw from a political contest; sentence: 1 year suspended plus prohibition on running for office or state employment.
- Leftwich had maintained a campaign committee, raised funds (~$110,000), and engaged in campaign activity for reelection through 2010; on May 28, 2010 she publicly announced she would not run.
- Legislative action created a three-year, $80,000 "Transition Coordinator" position at the Medical Examiner’s Office; Representative Randall Terrill promoted Leftwich for that role and arranged funding transfers. Governor vetoed the bill creating and funding the position.
- Evidence showed coordinated efforts by Terrill and others to secure the job for Leftwich contingent on her withdrawal, and contacts that discouraged potential challengers (e.g., Mike Christian). Leftwich admitted soliciting/accepting contributions and that she wanted the job.
- On appeal Leftwich preserved only legal questions concerning the meanings of "candidate" and "withdraw" under the Election Code and raised a vagueness/due process challenge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Leftwich) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "candidate" in 26 O.S. §§ 16-107–108 includes persons who have not filed a Declaration of Candidacy | "Candidate" should be read broadly (use Title 21 §187/ethics definition): persons who solicit/accept contributions or otherwise seek election | "Candidate" means only someone who filed a Declaration of Candidacy under 26 O.S. §5-101 (narrow reading) | Court: adopt Title 21 §187/ethics definition; Title 26 has no exclusive definition—Leftwich was a candidate |
| Whether "withdraw" requires filing formal written notice under filing statutes (e.g., §5-115) | "Withdraw" can be demonstrated by conduct (public announcement or equivalent acts) when person is a candidate under §187 | Withdrawal requires statutory filing only; absent filing, no crime under §16-108 | Court: §5-115–5-116.1 are not exclusive; public announcement sufficed—Leftwich withdrew |
| Vagueness / due process: whether applying §187 definition renders §16-108 unconstitutionally vague or retroactive | Statute gives fair notice when read with §187/ethics rules; reasonable persons would know prohibited conduct | Application is unforeseeable/expands statute retroactively; encourages arbitrary enforcement | Court: statute not void for vagueness; no due process violation; prosecution proper |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Tran, 172 P.3d 199 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007) (strict construction of criminal statutes; reliance on statutory definitions in other Titles)
- Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (U.S. 1964) (judicial construction cannot retroactively create criminal liability without fair notice)
- Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430 (U.S. 1973) (Bouie applied where interpretation of statutory term expanded into unforeseeable criminality)
- Powers v. Owen, 419 P.2d 277 (Okla. Crim. App. 1966) (statute must give fair notice; courts will not import external treaties/definitions to criminalize conduct unexpectedly)
- Allen v. City of Oklahoma City, 965 P.2d 387 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (statute not vague if reasonable people would understand conduct is proscribed)