LEFTWICH v. STATE
2015 OK CR 5
| Okla. Crim. App. | 2015Background
- Deborah Leftwich, an Oklahoma State Senator, raised funds and maintained a campaign committee for reelection from 2007–2010 but announced on May 28, 2010 she would not seek reelection. She was tried by bench trial and convicted under 26 O.S. § 16-108 for soliciting/accepting a bribe to withdraw from a political contest.
- Alleged quid pro quo: Representative Randall Terrill engineered creation and funding of a three‑year, $80,000 “Transition Coordinator” position at the Medical Examiner’s office, which Leftwich desired; evidence showed legislators drafted statutory language and funding to facilitate her hire.
- Leftwich admitted she solicited/accepted campaign contributions, sought the Medical Examiner position, and that taking that job was inconsistent with running for reelection. She waived most issues on appeal but challenged legal definitions of “candidate” and “withdraw.”
- Key statutory question: Whether the Election Code bribery statute (26 O.S. §§ 16-107–16-108) applies to persons who have not filed a Declaration of Candidacy and whether “withdraw” requires the formal withdrawal filing in Title 26.
- The trial court and this Court considered extrinsic definitions (Title 21 § 187 and Ethics Commission rules) defining “candidate” to include persons who solicit or accept contributions or make expenditures, and found Leftwich met that definition. The Court affirmed conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "candidate" for §§16-107–108 is limited to persons who filed a Declaration of Candidacy under 26 O.S. §5-101 | State: term should be read to include persons who solicit/accept contributions per Title 21 §187 and Ethics rules | Leftwich: "candidate" in Title 26 means only those who filed a Declaration of Candidacy during the filing period | Court: "candidate" for bribery statutes may be defined by Title 21 §187/Ethics rules; Leftwich was a candidate under that definition; conviction affirmed |
| Whether "withdraw" requires the formal written withdrawal under Title 26 (e.g., §5-115) | State: withdrawal can occur by actions/public announcement and is not limited to statutory filing methods | Leftwich: withdrawal must be the formal notice to secretary per Title 26 provisions | Court: statutory withdrawal mechanisms are not exclusive; public announcement not to run satisfied withdrawal element; proposition denied |
| Whether applying Title 21 §187 definition renders §16-108 void for vagueness or violates due process | State: reasonable person would understand conduct was proscribed given Ethics rules and common campaign practices | Leftwich: retroactive or unforeseeable expansion of statute; arbitrary enforcement | Court: definition and application were foreseeable; statute not unconstitutionally vague; due process claim denied |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Tran, 172 P.3d 199 (Okla. Cr. App. 2007) (strict statutory construction and use of Title-wide definitions)
- King v. State, 182 P.3d 842 (Okla. Cr. App. 2008) (use of plain meaning and statutory construction principles)
- Owens v. State, 229 P.3d 1261 (Okla. Cr. App. 2010) (consulting related statutory definitions to discern legislative intent)
- Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (U.S. 1964) (due process limits on retroactive judicial expansions of criminal statutes)
- Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430 (U.S. 1973) (application of Bouie to notice of criminal liability in probation context)
- Allen v. City of Oklahoma City, 965 P.2d 387 (Okla. Cr. App. 1998) (vagueness/due process standard: reasonable persons must have fair notice)