Lee v. Conagra Brands, Inc., 958 F.3d 70

Plaintiff Margaret Lee bought Wesson vegetable oil labeled "100% Natural" in Massachusetts, later learned it contained GMOs, and sued Conagra under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A on behalf of a class for deceptive marketing.
Lee sought damages (including treble or statutory minimum per purchase), attorneys' fees, and a limited injunction; she did not seek a mandatory affirmative GMO disclosure.
Conagra removed under CAFA; the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, reasoning the label conformed with FDA labeling policy and the FDA does not require GMO disclosure.
On appeal the First Circuit reviewed de novo, accepting plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations (including that reasonable consumers view "100% Natural" as GMO-free and pay a premium) and applying FTC/FDA deference principles.
The panel addressed (1) whether the label could be deceptive under Chapter 93A given existing FDA guidance, (2) preemption arguments under the NLEA and the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard (NBFDS), and (3) whether Lee alleged a cognizable Chapter 93A injury.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether "100% Natural" label is deceptive under Chapter 93A (capacity to mislead re: GMOs)	"100% Natural" reasonably conveys GMO-free; label induced purchase	Label conforms to FDA policy and thus cannot be deceptive	Reversed dismissal: complaint plausibly alleges label could deceive reasonable consumers into believing no GMOs
Whether FDA guidance/safe harbor forecloses state-law deception claim	FDA has not defined "natural" or authorized calling GMO-containing foods "100% Natural"; agency statements nonbinding	FDA policy permits "natural" usage and generally does not require GMO disclosure, creating a safe harbor	FDA guidance is nonbinding and not a comprehensive definition; it does not preclude a deceptive-practice claim
Whether federal law (NLEA or NBFDS) preempts Lee's state-law claim	Chapter 93A claim seeks to remedy an alleged misrepresentation, not to impose a labeling requirement that conflicts with federal law	NLEA or NBFDS preempt state requirements regarding GMO labeling, so claim is preempted	NLEA preemption argument waived; NBFDS does not cover "absence" claims and does not preempt Lee's deceptive-practice theory
Whether Lee pleaded a cognizable Chapter 93A injury	Consumers paid a premium for "natural"/GMO-free oil; alleges economic loss (benefit-of-the-bargain)	No cognizable injury—mere regulatory noncompliance or abstract impairment	Plausibly alleged economic injury: benefit-of-the-bargain loss suffices at pleading stage

Sepúlveda-Villarini v. Dep't of Educ. of P.R., 628 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2010) (pleading standard review de novo)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility pleading standard)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (Twombly/Iqbal pleading framework)
Dumont v. Reily Foods Co., 934 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2019) (analyzing "natural" claims under state consumer-protection law)
Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., 813 N.E.2d 476 (Mass. 2004) (Chapter 93A/deceptive-practices standard informed by FTC Act)
Abruzzi Foods, Inc. v. Pasta & Cheese, Inc., 986 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1993) (agency guidance not dispositive where no binding rule)
Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2009) (FDA statements about "natural" are nonbinding for private claims)
Shaulis v. Nordstrom, Inc., 865 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017) (Rule 9(b) heightened pleading for fraud-based claims)
Bellermann v. Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co., 54 N.E.3d 1106 (Mass. 2016) (Chapter 93A requires economic or noneconomic injury)