Lee Marvin Sanders and Matthew Sodrok v. the Boeing Company, Kidde Technologies, Inc., and Jamco America, Inc., 680 S.W.3d 340

Two flight attendants alleged 2017 injuries from a malfunctioning smoke detector and sued within Texas's two-year statute of limitations.
They first filed (and promptly nonsuited) in a federal court in Houston, then refiled in federal court in Dallas before limitations expired; defendants were later added and discovery proceeded.
The Dallas court, acting sua sponte, found the complaint failed to plead diversity properly, gave leave to amend, and ultimately dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (and alternatively Rule 41(b)).
The plaintiffs appealed; the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, denied rehearing, and issued mandate; plaintiffs then refilled in state court within the window after mandate/rehearing denial; Boeing removed and moved to dismiss as time-barred.
The federal district court held Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.064 did not toll limitations because the prior federal court could have had jurisdiction; the Fifth Circuit certified two questions to the Texas Supreme Court.
The Texas Supreme Court answered both certified questions: § 16.064 applies here (no strict "wrong-court" requirement), and the 60-day refiling period runs from exhaustion of appellate remedies (when the dismissal becomes final in effect).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 16.064(a)(1) applies when the first court dismissed "because of lack of jurisdiction" but could have had jurisdiction if jurisdictional facts were properly pleaded	§ 16.064 applies because the dismissal was made "because of lack of jurisdiction," so tolling triggers even if court could have had jurisdiction	§ 16.064 requires the prior court actually lack jurisdiction (a "wrong court"); if the court could have had jurisdiction, tolling doesn't apply	Court: Yes. § 16.064(a)(1) requires dismissal "because of lack of jurisdiction;" no separate requirement that the prior court be incapable of exercising jurisdiction or be the "wrong court."
When the 60-day clock in § 16.064(a)(2) begins — at trial-court loss of plenary power or only after appeals are exhausted	The 60-day period runs after the dismissal "becomes final," meaning after appellate remedies are exhausted and courts lose plenary power	The dismissal "becomes final" when the court that ordered dismissal loses plenary power (so appeal does not delay the 60-day clock)	Court: The clock begins only when the dismissal becomes final in effect — after all appeals/rehearing opportunities are exhausted and appellate courts lose plenary power.

City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2009) (prior Texas decisions describing § 16.064's tolling for suits filed in the "wrong court")
In re United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 307 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2010) (construing § 16.064 and its predecessor as tolling for suits filed in courts lacking jurisdiction)
Nathan v. Whittington, 408 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. 2013) (discussing § 16.064's requirement that suit be filed before limitations expire)
Tech. Consultant Servs., Inc. v. Lakewood Pipe of Tex., Inc., 861 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1988) (permitting § 16.064-style tolling across multiple refilings and treating the "second" suit as the next filing)
Long Island Tr. Co. v. Dicker, 659 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1981) (reading article 5539a plainly to apply where prior dismissal was for lack of jurisdiction)
Rigo Mfg. Co. v. Thomas, 458 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1970) (addressing timeliness of refiling under predecessor tolling provision)
Continental Gin Co. v. Thorndale Mercantile Co., 254 S.W. 939 (Tex. Comm’n Op. 1923) (explaining that a judgment is not final in effect while appellate proceedings are pending)
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001) (framework for finality of judgments and appellate-review context)