11 F.4th 498
6th Cir.2021Background
- Lee Briggs, a Black male Compensation Analyst at the University of Cincinnati (UC), was paid substantially less (mid-40s) than Cassandra Wittwer, a white female hired in 2015 as a Compensation Analyst at $53,000; Wittwer later received reclassifications and larger raises, and a later hire for a senior role was paid ~$76,000.
- Briggs requested pay-equity reviews in 2015 and 2017; his 2015 request was not implemented and his raises were modest; performance ratings for Briggs and Wittwer were mixed and contain inconsistent contemporaneous comments.
- On November 8, 2017, Briggs complained of pay discrimination to his supervisor Grunow and to UC’s Office of Equal Opportunity & Access (OEOA); shortly thereafter management altered/pulled a proposed Senior Compensation Analyst posting that Stidham had encouraged Briggs to apply for, ultimately posting a version requiring a bachelor’s degree or seven years’ experience.
- UC filled the senior position with a white woman (Rebecca Douglas) at a significantly higher salary; Briggs alleges sex- and race-based wage discrimination under the Equal Pay Act (EPA) and Title VII and retaliation for filing his complaint.
- The district court granted UC summary judgment; the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding genuine disputes of material fact remain on Briggs’s EPA and Title VII wage claims and on his retaliation claim and that the district court erred in resolving an uncontested prima facie element sua sponte.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| EPA wage discrimination (sex) | Briggs was paid less than female comparator Wittwer for equal work; UC cannot justify the persistent pay gap | UC says pay gap resulted from factors other than sex (prior salary/demand, performance, skills, degree) | Reversed: UC failed to prove "factor other than sex" defense as a matter of law; genuine factual disputes preclude summary judgment |
| Title VII wage discrimination (race & sex) | Pay disparity and promotion decisions were motivated by race/sex | UC articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons (experience, performance, qualifications) | Reversed: UC met its initial burden but Briggs produced sufficient evidence of pretext (inconsistencies, post-hoc rationales) to survive summary judgment |
| Retaliation for complaint (job posting altered/withdrawn) | After Briggs’s complaint, Grunow materially altered/withdrew posting to make Briggs ineligible; timing and communications show retaliatory motive | UC contends it honestly believed Briggs unqualified (honest-belief defense) and therefore acted non-retaliatorily | Reversed: district court improperly granted SJ on causation sua sponte; record supports prima facie causation and raises factual disputes on pretext so SJ inappropriate |
| Procedural error: district court sua sponte ruling | Briggs: court erred by deciding an uncontested prima facie element without notice and opportunity to respond | UC suggested honest-belief defense implicates causation | Held: Court erred—granting summary judgment on a ground the defendant did not timely raise violated Rule 56 principles; honest-belief addresses pretext at a later McDonnell Douglas stage |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishes burden-shifting framework for discrimination cases)
- Beck-Wilson v. Principi, 441 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2006) (EPA equal-work/stepwise analysis)
- Schleicher v. Preferred Sol’ns, Inc., 831 F.3d 746 (6th Cir. 2016) (articulates EPA three-step framework and burden on defendant’s affirmative defenses)
- J.C. Penney Co. v. EEOC, 843 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1988) ("factor other than sex" must be adopted for a legitimate business reason and used reasonably)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (prima facie case plus evidence of falsity can permit inference of discrimination)
- Clay v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 501 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2007) (honest-belief rule and its application to pretext inquiries)
- Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2008) (retaliation claims analyzed under McDonnell Douglas framework)