Lawrence Jefferson v. GDCP Warden
941 F.3d 452
| 11th Cir. | 2019Background
- Lawrence Jefferson was convicted of felony murder in Georgia (1986) and the jury unanimously recommended death; Georgia requires unanimity to impose life unless jury agrees to death.
- Trial counsel retained Dr. Gary Dudley, whose written report recommended neuropsychological testing to rule out organic brain damage from a severe head injury Jefferson suffered at age two; counsel did not obtain further testing or present that evidence at sentencing.
- The state habeas judge adopted the State’s proposed order verbatim after an ex parte solicitation by the judge’s clerk; the adopted order contained many errors and no opportunity was given to Jefferson to submit competing findings.
- The U.S. Supreme Court vacated an earlier Eleventh Circuit decision and remanded to develop the record on whether the state-court factfinding was entitled to pre‑AEDPA deference (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994)).
- On remand the district court found the state habeas proceeding was not a full and fair hearing (so the state factual findings lost their presumption of correctness), credited Jefferson’s mental‑health experts (finding organic frontal‑lobe damage), and held counsel’s failure to pursue testing was deficient and prejudicial; it vacated the death sentence and ordered a new sentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether state habeas court’s verbatim adoption of the State’s proposed order deprived Jefferson of a full and fair hearing under pre‑AEDPA § 2254(d) | Judge’s ex parte solicitation and uncritical adoption, plus internal errors, show the state hearing was not full and fair; findings lose presumption of correctness | Verbatim adoption is permissible; Georgia Supreme Court review cured any procedural defect | Court: State habeas proceedings were not full and fair; state factual findings are not entitled to pre‑AEDPA presumption of correctness |
| Whether trial counsel’s failure to obtain neuropsychological testing was objectively unreasonable (Strickland performance prong) | Counsel ignored Dudley’s unambiguous written recommendation and multiple red flags indicating organic brain damage; failure was neglect, not strategy | Counsel reasonably relied on oral assurances and investigative choices; decision was strategic | Court: Counsel’s failure was unreasonable (neglect/inexperience), not a protected strategy; performance deficient |
| Whether counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced sentencing (Strickland prejudice prong) | Comprehensive evidence of organic frontal‑lobe damage would have changed jurors’ view of moral culpability and weakened aggravators; reasonable probability at least one juror would have voted differently | Presenting brain‑injury evidence could have conflicted with innocence claims and might not have swayed jurors; State’s expert undermines brain‑damage claim | Court: Prejudice established — reasonable probability at least one juror would have voted against death; new sentencing ordered |
| Whether any appellate/state‑court review cured the procedural defect | Jefferson: Georgia Supreme Court merely deferred to trial‑court findings and did not conduct independent factfinding | State: Georgia Supreme Court review validated findings and preserves deference | Court: Appellate review did not eliminate the procedural taint; presumption of correctness unavailable under pre‑AEDPA standards |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance test: performance and prejudice)
- Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (federal courts must hold evidentiary hearing where state proceeding was not full and fair)
- Jefferson v. Upton, 560 U.S. 284 (2010) (Supreme Court remand directing lower courts to develop record on whether verbatim adoption deprived petitioner of a full and fair state hearing under pre‑AEDPA § 2254)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (failure to investigate mitigation can be deficient where red flags existed and investigation would have produced powerful mitigating evidence)
- Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (discussion of when a court’s adoption of a party’s proposed findings is problematic)