2013 COA 153
Colo. Ct. App.2013Background
- Consolidated plaintiffs challenge PERA Rule 7.45(E) and Standard’s disability policy as inconsistent with §24-51-702(1)(a).
- PERA administers short-term disability and disability retirement; Standard under contract insures STD benefits.
- Section 708 authorizes PERA to contract with a disability program administrator and adopt rules including disability standards.
- Rule 7.45(E) provides STD eligibility only if the member cannot perform any job earning at least 75% of predisability earnings.
- District court upheld Rule 7.45(E) and the STD policy as consistent with the statute; the judgments were entered against plaintiffs.
- Court reviews the statutory interpretation de novo and defers to PERA’s construction if reasonable and consistent with the statute’s language and purpose.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 7.45(E) conflicts with §24-51-702(1)(a). | Lawless/Hogan/Mills argue 702(1)(a) requires STD for those unable to perform their own job. | PERA contends Rule 7.45(E) fits a framework and allows broad discretion consistent with 708. | No conflict; Rule 7.45(E) reasonable within PERA’s discretion. |
| Whether PERA had authority to implement Rule 7.45(E) under the statute. | Statute’s ambiguity limits PERA’s rulemaking to clear mandates. | Legislative framework grants PERA broad authority to define disability and administer STD. | PERA acted within its delegated authority; rule within statutory framework. |
| Whether the statutory language is ambiguous and thus subject to extrinsic construction. | Ambiguity exists between mandatory benefits and flexible framework. | Ambiguity exists but extrinsic aids support PERA’s interpretation. | Statute is ambiguous; extrinsic aids support PERA’s interpretation. |
Key Cases Cited
- McCool v. Sears, 186 P.3d 147 (Colo. App. 2008) (agency rule cannot contravene statute; regulation must align with statute)
- Hawes v. Colo. Div. of Ins., 65 P.3d 1008 (Colo. 2003) (implications of agency discretion in regulatory schemes)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (U.S. 1984) (deference to agency interpretations when authorized by statute)
- Hewlett-Packard Co. v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 749 P.2d 400 (Colo. 1988) (regulatory interpretations persuasively continued when legislature reenacts)
- Colo. Consumer Health Initiative v. Colo. Bd. of Health, 240 P.3d 525 (Colo. App. 2010) (agency interpretations deemed consistent with statute when not contrary to plain language)
- Sperry v. Field, 205 P.3d 865 (Colo. 2009) (ambiguity can arise from statute structure and language)