Law School Admission Council, Inc. v. State
166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 647
Cal. Ct. App.2014Background
- LSAC, a nonprofit that administers the LSAT for admission to ABA-approved law schools, grants accommodations (most commonly extra time) under ADA-compliant procedures and historically “flags” scores earned with extended time and omits certain comparative statistics from flagged reports.
- California enacted Ed. Code § 99161.5 (effective Jan 1, 2013) directed at the LSAT test sponsor: (a) requires timely accommodations and public procedures; (b) requires giving considerable weight to prior accommodations documentation; and (c) prohibits notifying score recipients that a score was obtained with an accommodation or withholding information that would reveal that fact (anti-flagging).
- Legislature targeted the LSAT sponsor based on legislative findings and advocacy (including ABA input) that LSAC’s documentation requirements and flagging discouraged accommodation requests and disadvantaged applicants with disabilities in law school admissions.
- LSAC sued, seeking declaratory/injunctive relief under the California Constitution, alleging § 99161.5 violated equal protection, liberty of speech (free speech), the special legislation clause, and the bill of attainder prohibition; it obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement pending trial.
- The Court of Appeal stayed the injunction as to § 99161.5(c) pending appeal and reversed the preliminary injunction, holding (1) LSAC is not similarly situated to other test sponsors for equal protection/special-legislation purposes because no other sponsor administers the LSAT, and (2) LSAC failed to show a sufficient likelihood of prevailing on its free-speech claim or that interim harm favored enjoining the statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equal protection / Special legislation — singling out LSAC | LSAC: other test sponsors are similarly situated; singling out LSAC lacks a rational basis. | State: LSAC is different because it alone sponsors the LSAT and its practices (stringent documentation, flagging) materially affect law school admissions. | Court: § 99161.5 survives rational-basis review — LSAC is not similarly situated to other test sponsors for the statute’s purpose (preventing discrimination in law school admissions). |
| Free speech — anti-flagging prohibits LSAC speech to law schools | LSAC: anti-flagging is a content-based speech restriction and likely unconstitutional. | State: speech is at most commercial or consumer-report-like and may be regulated to prevent discrimination. | Court: Speech is commercial/consumer-report type; intermediate (Central Hudson) review applies. LSAC failed to show likely success on the merits; constitutionality depends on factual proof that flagging causes discrimination. |
| Bill of attainder | LSAC: statute targets LSAC and punishes it without trial. | State: statute applies to "test sponsor of the LSAT," not specifically punitive, and would apply to any future LSAT sponsor. | Court: Not a bill of attainder; statute’s requirements are regulatory, not punishment. |
| Preliminary injunction / balance of harms | LSAC: irreparable harm from being forced to send altered/omitted score information and constitutional rights infringement. | State: injunction would prevent enforcement of a statute protecting applicants with disabilities and risk irreparable harm to them. | Court: Because LSAC’s likelihood of prevailing on free-speech claim is uncertain and applicants with disabilities face substantial, irreparable harms if enforcement is enjoined, the trial court abused its discretion in granting the injunction. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Brown, 54 Cal.4th 314 (Cal. 2012) (equal protection similarly situated framework)
- Cooley v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.4th 228 (Cal. 2002) (definition of "similarly situated" for equal protection)
- Walgreen Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 185 Cal.App.4th 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (treatment of similarly situated entities under regulation)
- Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (U.S. 1980) (commercial speech intermediate-scrutiny test)
- Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal.4th 939 (Cal. 2002) (commercial speech factors: speaker, audience, content)
- Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (U.S. 1985) (consumer/credit reports and diminished First Amendment protection)
- Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (U.S. 2001) (overbroad regulation of commercial speech must fit government interest)
- Doe v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 199 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999) (flagging not per se ADA violation; context-dependent)