Lauren Richwine v. Kathleen Matuszak, 148 F.4th 942

Lauren Richwine, through Death Done Differently LLC, provides services as a "death doula" in Indiana, offering emotional and planning support around the death of loved ones, but is not a licensed funeral director.
The State of Indiana alleged that these services constituted the unlicensed practice of funeral services, triggering an investigation and a cease-and-desist order from the State Board of Funeral and Cemetery Service.
The cease-and-desist agreement prohibited Richwine from counseling about funeral options, facilitating community death care, and supporting funeral home transactions.
Richwine and Death Done Differently sued in federal court, alleging that enforcement of the statute violates their First Amendment rights and sought a preliminary injunction.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction barring the statute’s enforcement; the state appealed that decision to the Seventh Circuit.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did plaintiff waive their right to sue by signing the cease-and-desist?	They did not waive federal rights; the agreement only waived Indiana law rights, not their right to seek First Amendment relief in federal court.	The agreement constituted a waiver of the right to sue regarding speech-based services.	No waiver; agreement was not clear or unmistakable as to federal rights.
Should the federal court abstain under Younger?	No ongoing state proceeding—the case was finalized and plaintiffs’ challenge is prospective.	The Board maintains jurisdiction so abstention is required.	No abstention; no ongoing state proceeding that would be interfered with.
Does Indiana’s statute, as applied, violate the First Amendment?	The law is content-based, restricts protected speech, and fails both strict and intermediate scrutiny.	The law targets conduct, not speech, and is justified by public health and consumer protection interests.	The statute fails even intermediate scrutiny; the burden on plaintiffs’ speech is not narrowly tailored to the state’s goals.
Are restrictions on plaintiffs' advertisements for their services valid?	Ads truthfully describe legal services; restriction is unjustified if the statute itself is invalid.	Ads are misleading if the underlying services are unlawful.	Ads not misleading if underlying restriction is unconstitutional; injunction proper.

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (intentional waiver of constitutional rights must be clear and unmistakable)
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (content-based speech regulations are presumptively unconstitutional and require strict scrutiny)
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (framework for intermediate scrutiny of speech restrictions)
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (consumers have a right to receive information under the First Amendment)
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (regulation must not be substantially broader than necessary to serve government interests)
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (preliminary injunction standard requires showing of likelihood of success and balance of harms)