Laura Jordan v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC
781 F.3d 1178
| 9th Cir. | 2015Background
- Jordan sued Nationstar in Washington state court (April 2012) alleging, among other claims, FDCPA violations and sought class relief; she did not plead a specific amount in controversy.
- Nationstar was beneficiary on Jordan’s deed of trust and had agents enter her home after default; no foreclosure was commenced.
- The state court certified the proposed class on May 9, 2014.
- On June 3, 2014 Jordan answered interrogatories stating the total monetary damages would exceed $25 million.
- Nationstar removed to federal court on June 5, 2014 under CAFA; Jordan moved to remand, arguing removal was untimely because the case had been removable under federal-question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331) for over two years.
- The district court remanded and awarded attorney’s fees to Jordan; Nationstar appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 30‑day removal period resets when a defendant first discovers a CAFA ground for removal, even if an earlier pleading already revealed a different federal basis | Jordan: Removal was untimely because the FDCPA-based federal-question jurisdiction made the case removable more than 30 days earlier | Nationstar: Following Durham, the 30‑day clock restarts when a newly discovered basis for removal (here CAFA) is first ascertainable | The 9th Cir. held the 30‑day period may start when the CAFA ground is first disclosed; Nationstar’s removal was timely |
| Whether CAFA removal should be strictly construed against removal like other removal statutes | Jordan: CAFA removal must follow strict removal-timing rules; earlier federal basis triggers the 30‑day limit | Nationstar: CAFA (like §1442) should be construed broadly in favor of removal to effect congressional intent | Court: Dart Cherokee removed any anti-removal presumption for CAFA; CAFA should be liberally construed for removal timing |
| Whether the district court’s award of attorney fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) was appropriate | Jordan: Fees appropriate because removal lacked an objectively reasonable basis | Nationstar: Removal was reasonable under Durham-like logic and CAFA principles | Court: Reversed fee award because Dart Cherokee and the extended Durham approach make Nationstar’s removal objectively reasonable |
| Applicability of Durham v. Lockheed Martin to CAFA removals | Jordan: Durham pertains to §1442 (federal officer) only, not CAFA | Nationstar: Durham’s rule—treating removal grounds separately—should extend to CAFA to prevent gamesmanship and permit single-defendant removal | Court: Extended Durham logic to CAFA removals; CAFA ground disclosure governs removability under §1446 |
Key Cases Cited
- Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2006) (held that the 30‑day removal clock restarts when a defendant first discovers a federal‑officer basis for removal)
- Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014) (Supreme Court: no antiremoval presumption for CAFA; CAFA should be read to facilitate federal adjudication of interstate class actions)
- Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132 (2005) (awarding fees under §1447(c) requires that removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis)