Laura Holmes v. FEC
16-5194
| D.C. Cir. | Nov 28, 2017Background
- FECA imposes "base" contribution limits on individuals to each federal candidate per election (2014 per-election limit: $2,600).
- Plaintiffs (Holmes and Jost) made no primary contributions but each gave $2,600 in the 2014 general and sought to give an additional $2,600 in the general (for $5,200 total) but were barred by FECA.
- Plaintiffs sued the FEC, claiming FECA’s per-election structure (separate $2,600 limits for primary and general) violates the First Amendment by preventing a donor from allocating the combined amount into one election.
- The district court declined to certify the constitutional question; a panel remanded for certification to the en banc D.C. Circuit, which presented the question whether the per-election limits violate freedom of association.
- The en banc D.C. Circuit held that Congress may validly set contribution limits with a chosen time frame (here, per-election) and rejected plaintiffs’ attempt to convert the statutory per-election ceiling into a per-cycle or carryover entitlement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether FECA’s per-election structure violates the First Amendment by denying a donor who skipped the primary the ability to give a larger single general-election contribution | Per-election structure unlawfully bifurcates an effective $5,200 ceiling and therefore donors must be allowed to allocate the combined amount into the general election | Congress permissibly set a $2,600 limit that applies separately to each election; timeframe is an integral part of any contribution limit and need not separately justify anti-corruption effects | Court held per-election structure constitutional; plaintiffs’ claim rejected |
| Whether the per-election timeframe must independently satisfy Buckley’s "closely drawn" anti-corruption test (or is invalid as a redundant prophylaxis like the McCutcheon aggregate limits) | The per-election split is an additional restriction layered on the base limit and must independently be "closely drawn," which it fails to be because equal total contributions across both elections are already permitted | Timeframe is an essential element of a contribution limit (dollar cap + period); unlike McCutcheon’s aggregate limits, the per-election feature is part of the base limit and Buckley already assessed such a base limit under the closely drawn standard | Held that timeframe need not separately be justified; Buckley’s review of per-election base limits controls |
| Whether regulatory practices (allowing upfront $5,200 payments or transfers of unused primary funds) undermine the statute’s per-election structure | Regulations permitting commingling/transfer show per-election limits are meaningless, supporting plaintiffs’ claim | Regulations merely provide administrative convenience or permit campaigns (not donors) to transfer unused funds; they do not change the statute’s per-election cap | Held regulations do not invalidate or alter the statutory per-election ceiling |
| Whether accepting plaintiffs’ theory would destabilize contribution limits generally (e.g., runoffs, multi-cycle contributions) | Plaintiffs limited their request to backloading within a cycle and disavow rollovers across cycles | Allowing carryover would create arbitrary outcomes (e.g., runoffs would permit larger single-election gifts) and undermine enforceability of any time-based ceiling | Held plaintiffs’ theory would unreasonably convert any time-based cap into a rolling entitlement and is incompatible with Buckley |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (upheld base contribution limits and applied the "closely drawn" standard for contribution limits)
- McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (invalidated aggregate limits; distinguished base limits and condemned "prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis" layering)
- Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (plurality opinion invalidating overly low contribution limits; limits can be struck if they prevent effective campaigns)
- Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (procedural context on challenges to FECA; cited for certification mechanism)
- Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (describes how to treat plurality opinions when determining controlling precedent)