Lattisaw v. District of Columbia
118 F. Supp. 3d 142
| D.D.C. | 2015Background
- Plaintiff Joseph W. Lattisaw, an African‑American former MPD officer, alleges retaliation after he complained of a 2002 sexual‑harassment incident by a superior, culminating in an involuntary mental‑health retirement in September 2006.
- Key factual events: the 9/15/2002 alleged harassment; an altered PD Form 42 injury report posted in October 2002; PFC treatment and a PFRRB retirement determination in 2006 (with partial remand and some later favorable findings regarding workplace harassment).
- Lattisaw previously litigated related tort claims in D.C. Superior Court (2003), which were dismissed for failure to exhaust CMPA remedies and affirmed on appeal; he also pursued administrative filings with EEOC/OHR at various times, with an EEOC dismissal/Right‑to‑Sue issued February 27, 2013.
- Plaintiff filed this federal action (May 24, 2013) asserting Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, DCHRA and common‑law tort claims; defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The district court treated the MPD, PFC, and PFRRB as non‑suable separate entities and construed official‑capacity claims against named officials as claims against the District of Columbia.
- The court concluded the federal claims (Title VII, §§ 1981, 1983) are time‑barred and that §§ 1985/1986 claims are inadequately pleaded; it declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims and dismissed the entire complaint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper parties | Sued District, MPD, PFC, PFRRB and officials; intends relief against them | MPD/PFC/PFRRB are non‑suable subunits; official‑capacity suits against officials are suits against the District | Only the District of Columbia is a proper institutional defendant; other named entities/officials dismissed |
| Timeliness of Title VII claims | Reliance on continuing violations; recent EEOC charges (2012–2013) justify filing | EEOC charge (Feb 2013) came long after alleged discrete acts (2002–2006); 300‑day rule bars claims not within 300 days | Title VII claims untimely; discrete acts occurred well outside the 300‑day window and continuing‑violation doctrine inapplicable |
| Timeliness/statute for § 1981 and § 1983 claims | Tolling, discovery rule, equitable tolling, continuous treatment/representation | §1981 time bar (four‑year or state analogue), §1983 three‑year D.C. limitations; accrual at adverse act/retirement in 2006 | §1981 and §1983 claims conclusively time‑barred (limitations accrued by 2006; tolling/discovery doctrines not shown) |
| Sufficiency of §§ 1985/1986 conspiracy claims | Alleged improper influence on OHR/EEOC and actions leading to forced retirement | Pleading fails to allege class‑based discriminatory animus, specific conspiratorial agreement, or acts in furtherance | §§ 1985 and 1986 claims dismissed for failure to plead essential elements (no factual allegations of class‑based animus or specific conspiratorial acts) |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading requires plausibility)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (court may disregard conclusory legal statements)
- Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (discrete acts v. hostile‑work‑environment timing)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires policy/custom causing injury)
- Earle v. District of Columbia, 707 F.3d 299 (D.C. Cir. on continuing‑violation and tolling principles)
- Smith‑Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575 (limitations dismissal appropriate only if complaint is conclusively time‑barred)