Lashley v. New York University, 1:22-cv-01054

Background

Plaintiff Donna Lashley, a dark-skinned Black woman employed by New York University since 1990, alleges long‑standing race discrimination in pay and promotions and hostile treatment.
Alleged incidents include: HR told her in 2004 union status would impede management promotion; several less‑qualified white employees were promoted; a 2005 hiring passed her over for a white man; in 2012 she assumed duties without managerial title while a white counterpart held a higher title and pay.
In 2016 she was allegedly overlooked for an associate director role; in 2017–2018 a supervisor (Anya Takos) unsuccessfully requested a promotion/merit increase for her.
Lashley filed an EEOC charge on May 8, 2019 and received a right‑to‑sue letter on December 2, 2021.
NYU moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) Counts I, III, and V (failure‑to‑promote claims under Title VII, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL); the court assessed timeliness, continuing‑violation arguments, and pleading sufficiency for failure to promote.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Title VII timeliness (300‑day rule)	Lashley argues earlier acts are part of an ongoing "system of dissuasion" so continuing‑violation saves them	Acts before July 2018 are time‑barred because Title VII claims must be filed within 300 days of discrete acts	Court: continuing‑violation doctrine does not rescue discrete failure‑to‑promote acts; Title VII claims predating 300 days before EEOC filing are dismissed; only 2017–2018 and unspecified timely acts survive.
NYSHRL/NYCHRL timeliness (3‑year rule with EEOC tolling)	Argues EEOC tolling and continuing violation save older claims	Claims before Aug 4, 2016 are untimely given right‑to‑sue timing and tolling math	Court: pre‑2016 failure‑to‑promote claims dismissed; only a small set of post‑2016 allegations may be timely.
Applicability of continuing‑violation doctrine	Asserts a continuing discriminatory policy or practice that discouraged formal applications, so individual discrete acts should be aggregated	Morgan and subsequent authority treat failure‑to‑promote and similar discrete acts as not subject to continuing‑violation tolling; gaps of years undermine a pattern claim	Court: continuing‑violation doctrine inapplicable — plaintiff alleged isolated discrete acts with multi‑year gaps and no sufficiently pleaded discriminatory policy.
Failure‑to‑promote pleading sufficiency	Argues specific application allegations are impracticable due to informal processes and alleged dissuasion	Complaint fails to identify specific positions applied for and rejected; generic allegations inadequate under Brown/McDonnell Douglas framework	Court: dismissal granted for failure to plead application/rejection to a specific position; plaintiff given leave to amend to add requisite specificity.

Key Cases Cited

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility pleading standard)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility and Twombly pleading principles)
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (discrete discriminatory acts are not saved by continuing‑violation doctrine)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (framework for proving discriminatory failure to hire/promote)
Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706 (2d Cir. 1998) (requirement to plead specific application for failure‑to‑promote claims)
Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012) (failure‑to‑promote discrete‑act analysis)
Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015) (pleading standards and "plausible support" to prima facie allegations)
Pikulin v. City Univ. of New York, 176 F.3d 598 (2d Cir. 1999) (300‑day filing rule discussion for Title VII in New York)
Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1999) (EEOC filing/timeliness principles)