Larson v. State
2010 Minn. LEXIS 680
| Minn. | 2010Background
- In 1957, Minnesota condemned land to acquire a highway easement across Parcel 11 for TH 29.
- Final Certificate memorialized the easement and defined its scope and rights over the servient parcel.
- Mn/DOT constructed TH 29, including highway lanes, slopes, a rest area, a beach-related facilities, and drainage tied to Lake Le Homme Dieu.
- Since 1962 the public used the TH 29 rest area to access the lake; County obtained limited use beach permits starting in 1977 and renewed in 1981, 1987, and 1995.
- In 2008, Larson, as tenant in common with his brother, sought to discharge a portion of the State’s easement under Minn. Stat. § 117.225; the district court granted summary judgment for the State and County.
- The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed; the supreme court granted review and affirmed, holding 117.225 does not permit discharge of a portion of an easement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Minn. Stat. § 117.225 permit discharge of a portion of an easement? | Larson argues for liberal construction to discharge a portion. | State/County argues only full easement discharge is authorized. | Discharge of a portion is not authorized. |
| Does 'an easement' vs 'the easement' refer to the entire easement in § 117.225? | Larson contends section includes a portion. | State/County contends it refers to the entire easement. | The phrases refer to the entire easement; only discharge of the full easement is allowed. |
| Does the 'just and equitable' language modify the remedy, not the power to order? | Larson argues broad equitable tailoring of relief under § 117.225. | State/County argues last-antecedent rule limits the phrase to terms of discharge order. | Language limits to terms of the discharge order, not to the scope of power. |
| Should § 161.43 influence interpretation of § 117.225? | Larson points to 'portion of an easement' permissible under § 161.43 as contrary support. | State/County distinguishes statutes and relies on plain language; § 161.43 permits partial discharge but not § 117.225. | § 117.225 cannot be read to include a portion; § 161.43 is a different mechanism. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lowry v. City of Mankato, 231 Minn. 108 (1950) (interpretation of definite articles in statutory context)
- Burnquist v. Cook, 220 Minn. 48 (1945) (sovereign capacity of state; rules of strict construction)
- Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 575 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 1998) (definition of easement as an interest in land)
- Woodhall v. State, 738 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 2007) (last antecedent rule as a grammatical principle)
- Meister v. W. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 372 (Minn. 1992) (a court may look to prior legislation on same subject)
- Reiter v. Kiffmeyer, 721 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. 2006) (interpretive principle cited regarding reading statutes)
- American Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309 (Minn. 2001) (statutory interpretation involving ambiguity and plain meaning)