Larson v. State
2019 MT 28
Mont.2019Background
- Montana law allows a political party without recent 5% gubernatorial support to qualify for primary-ballot access by timely submitting petition signatures equaling 5% (or 5,000), including minimum signatures from at least one‑third of legislative districts, on a form prescribed by the Secretary of State (§ 13-10-601(2), MCA, incorporating §§ 13-27-302–306).
- In 2018 the Montana Green Party submitted ~10,160 signatures; county election administrators certified 7,386 valid signatures across 38 legislative districts and the Secretary of State certified the Green Party for the ballot.
- Plaintiffs (including the Montana Democratic Party) sued in state district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging 210 signatures were defective for reasons including false circulation affidavits, non‑matching signatures, wrong or altered dates, missing printed names, and non‑registered signers.
- After expedited evidentiary hearings, the district court invalidated 87 signatures across eight legislative districts, reducing qualifying districts from 38 to 30 and enjoined the Secretary from recognizing the Green Party certification; the Secretary appealed.
- The Montana Supreme Court affirmed: it held (1) a private declaratory/injunctive action to enforce § 13-10-601(2) is cognizable; (2) the challenge was justiciable and not a political question; (3) the Montana Democratic Party had standing; (4) the district court’s factual invalidation of 87 signatures was not clearly erroneous; and (5) the district court abused discretion in summarily admitting pro hac vice counsel but the error was harmless.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether plaintiffs stated a cognizable private claim to challenge Secretary’s certification under §13-10-601(2) | Declaratory judgment and injunction are available to enforce statutory petition requirements; existing administrative remedies are insufficient to fully protect election integrity. | The statutory scheme provides per-county challenge and referral to prosecutors; those administrative remedies are exclusive, precluding private suits. | Plaintiffs stated a cognizable claim; implied private enforcement via declaratory/injunctive relief is consistent with the statute and §13-35-108 and MUDJA. |
| 2. Whether the claim presented a non-justiciable political question | Judicial review is appropriate to enforce clear statutory standards and prevent unlawful ballot access. | Ballot access and election administration are political matters reserved to executive/legislative branches and the electorate. | Not a political question; courts have authority to adjudicate statutory compliance and preserve election integrity. |
| 3. Whether plaintiffs had standing | Democratic Party showed concrete, particularized harms (extra costs, campaign burdens) from an unlawful additional party on the ballot. | No private party has standing—challenges must be through statutorily prescribed administrative routes. | Democratic Party had standing: documentary/unrebutted testimony demonstrated direct, concrete injury remedied by declaratory/injunctive relief. |
| 4. Whether invalidation of 87 signatures was erroneous | The district court applied statutory and form-based standards (genuineness, matching names, correct dates, printed names, truthful affidavits) supported by testimony/exhibits. | Secretary argued courts improperly substituted form over substance and second-guessed county verifications. | Affirmed: factual findings (false circulator affidavits, non‑matching signatures, mismatched names, date defects, missing printed names) were supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous. |
| 5. Whether admitting out‑of‑state counsel pro hac vice was proper | Plaintiffs sought specialist counsel experienced in election/ballot qualification litigation. | No good cause: Plaintiffs had competent Montana counsel; motion was granted without findings in violation of Rule VI(C). | District court abused discretion by summarily admitting pro hac vice counsel, but the error was harmless (no prejudice). |
Key Cases Cited
- Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (political-question doctrine framework)
- Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (limits on judicial review of certain political matters)
- Montanans for Justice v. State ex rel. McGrath, 334 Mont. 237 (2006) (justiciability and review standards in election-law disputes)
- Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (factors for implying private remedies under statutes)
- Clarke v. Moran, 24 Mont. 433 (1900) (historic precedent recognizing judicial role enforcing election statutes)
- Wombold v. Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co. of Mont., Inc., 325 Mont. 290 (2004) (analysis of implied private rights of action)
- Klaudt v. Flink, 202 Mont. 247 (1983) (private action implied by statute analysis)
