Larrlyon Deshun Williams v. State, 473 S.W.3d 319

On May 22, 2010, Mouafad Kazzaz robbed a Bank of America in Sugar Land; evidence indicated appellant Larrlyon Williams served as the getaway driver.
During the immediate police pursuit of a white van, Kazzaz fired at Deputy Charles Scott, wounding him; shots from the van also struck bystander Arwen McGaw, causing serious injuries.
The van was later found disabled in a cul‑de‑sac; Kazzaz was dead inside the van and Williams surrendered after exiting the driver’s side.
Investigators recovered multiple firearms (including an AK‑47), ammunition, robber’s‑kit items, two cellphones (one found outside the van), a bluetooth earpiece, the robbery money in a cooler, and an extra license plate.
Evidence showed Williams had visited that bank two days earlier, calls between the two recovered cellphones occurred during the robbery, and a casing in Williams’s other vehicle matched a gun from the van.
Williams was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault of a public servant, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; he appealed claiming insufficiency of party liability evidence, an Article 36.16 charge correction error, and erroneous inclusion of a conspiracy instruction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Williams)	Held
Sufficiency of evidence that Williams was a party to the aggravated robbery	Evidence (bank visit, cellphone calls, bluetooth, getaway driving, extra plate, money in van) supports a reasonable inference Williams aided/encouraged robbery	No direct evidence Williams entered bank, used a weapon, or fired; evidence is contradictory and insufficient to prove he was a party	Affirmed — evidence legally sufficient under law of parties to convict Williams of aggravated robbery
Trial court corrected punishment charge after deliberations (Article 36.16)	Court corrected an erroneous parole eligibility instruction that misstated §508.145; post‑argument correction is permitted to fix an erroneous charge	Post‑argument correction violated Article 36.16 because prerequisites for supplemental charge were not met	Affirmed — correction of an acknowledged erroneous charge after deliberations began was permissible; no error requiring reversal
Inclusion of conspiracy (co‑conspirator) instruction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon	Evidence supported conspiracy/joint enterprise (planning, communication, getaway driving, weapons in van) making secondary violent acts foreseeable	Instruction was improper because insufficient evidence to convict Williams as a co‑conspirator for the aggravated assault	Affirmed — sufficient evidence supported submission of co‑conspirator liability instruction

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (application of Jackson standard in Texas)
Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (jury as fact‑finder and appellate deference to credibility determinations)
Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (verdict upheld if any authorizing theory in charge supported by evidence)
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (law‑of‑parties/co‑conspirator liability in getaway‑driver context)
Smith v. State, 898 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (trial court may correct an erroneous charge post‑argument)
Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (standards for review of jury charge errors)