Landry Rountree v. Troy Dyson
892 F.3d 681
5th Cir.2018Background
- Plaintiff Landry Rountree owned a tow business and relied heavily on Beaumont’s non-consent tow rotation for income; participation requires a city-issued towing permit.
- In Dec. 2013 Beaumont Police Chief Singletary revoked Rountree’s city towing permit after a competitor complained that several of Rountree’s state licenses had lapsed; Rountree alleges the chief encouraged that complaint.
- Rountree’s appeal to city officials failed; he conceded a city permit is required only for police-directed (non-consent) tows, not all private tows.
- March 2014: while his permit was suspended, Rountree responded to a customer’s accident; Sgt. Troy Dyson ordered him to leave the scene; Rountree refused and was arrested under a city ordinance forbidding tow operators without a permit from stopping near an accident; the charge was later dismissed.
- Jan. 2016: Rountree sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law for equal protection (class-of-one), false arrest, and related claims; the district court (magistrate judge) dismissed all claims; Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court acted sua sponte by ruling on a pending motion to dismiss after Rountree amended his complaint | Amendment nullified the pending motion so dismissal was sua sponte and improper | Court may treat a pending motion as addressed to an amended pleading if defects remain | Not sua sponte; court properly considered the city’s motion against the amended complaint |
| Whether a class-of-one equal protection claim lies for revocation/suspension of a tow permit (removal from non-consent list) | Rountree: suspension was arbitrary and targeted; treated differently than others | City: decision to include/remove from non-consent list is discretionary and analogous to public-employment decisions; class-of-one unavailable | Class-of-one claim unavailable for discretionary government decisions to include/remove vendors; claim dismissed |
| Whether Rountree alleged similarly situated comparators to support equal protection | Rountree: other tow companies were not disciplined for similar violations | City: Rountree failed to identify specific similarly situated persons or matching facts (complaints, license lapses, additional violations) | Allegations were conclusory; no adequate comparator pleaded; claim dismissed |
| Whether Sgt. Dyson is entitled to qualified immunity on false-arrest claim for arrest after Rountree refused order to leave | Rountree: arrest lacked probable cause; claim against Dyson should proceed | Dyson: ordinance made refusal to obey police order a misdemeanor; officer reasonably could believe he had probable cause; qualified immunity applies | Dyson entitled to qualified immunity; arrest was supported by probable cause for disobeying an order; false-arrest claim dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Integrity Collision Ctr. v. City of Fulshear, 837 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 2016) (class-of-one equal protection inapplicable to discretionary inclusion on non-consent tow list)
- Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (class-of-one claim incompatible with public-employment discretionary decisions)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: conclusory allegations insufficient)
- Lindquist v. City of Pasadena, 669 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2012) (elements for class-of-one equal protection and comparator requirements)
- Davidson v. City of Stafford, 848 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2017) (probable cause for arrest may be for any crime; qualified immunity standard)
- In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 624 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 2010) (district courts need not accept conclusory allegations or unwarranted inferences)
Disposition: Judgment of dismissal affirmed.