Landon v. Industrial Commission
240 Ariz. 21
| Ariz. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Curtis Landon worked for Quemetco performing heavy lifting; developed bilateral shoulder injuries and had surgeries in 2012.
- While his WC claims were pending/denied, he requested a full-duty release to return to work; Dr. Matanky issued a full-duty release on Sept. 4, 2012.
- Quemetco had filled Landon’s position; when he returned he was told his job was gone. He worked temporary lower‑pay jobs thereafter and experienced ongoing shoulder problems.
- In June 2013 Dr. Matanky placed Landon on no-work status; his claims were found compensable in April 2013.
- Landon sought temporary partial disability benefits for Sept. 4, 2012–June 3, 2013 under A.R.S. § 23-1044(A)/(D)/(G); the ALJ denied benefits because Landon had been released to full duty.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed whether a full-duty release precludes temporary partial disability benefits and whether the ALJ made necessary findings about loss of earning capacity.
Issues
| Issue | Landon’s Argument | Quemetco’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a full-duty medical release bars temporary partial disability benefits | Landon: A full-duty release does not automatically bar benefits; he suffered a loss of earning capacity after his job was filled and when working lower‑paid temp jobs | Quemetco: A work restriction is a precondition to temporary benefits; a full-duty release (no restrictions) forecloses benefits | Court: A full-duty release does not automatically bar benefits; entitlement turns on loss of earning capacity evidence |
| Whether Landon’s termination was "related" to his industrial injury under A.R.S. § 23-1044(D) | Landon: Termination was related because it resulted from surgery and recovery for his industrial injury | Quemetco: Termination was for non-injury business reasons because position was filled after long absence | Court: Termination was related to the injury where absence/surgery made replacement necessary; § 23-1044(D) applies here |
| What proof is required to establish loss of earning capacity | Landon: Show inability to return to date-of-injury job and good-faith efforts to obtain suitable work or labor-market testimony | Quemetco: Point to post‑injury work and the full‑duty release to show no loss of capacity | Court: Claimant must prove inability to return and either good‑faith job search or expert testimony; employer can rebut by showing other causes or availability of suitable work |
| Whether the ALJ’s findings adequately addressed loss of earning capacity | Landon: ALJ failed to make findings on whether he met his burden and on the § 23-1044(D)/(G) factors | Quemetco: ALJ found medical release and denied benefits on that basis | Held: ALJ’s findings were insufficient — no specific findings on loss of earning capacity or consideration of statutory factors; award set aside |
Key Cases Cited
- Zimmerman v. Industrial Commission, 137 Ariz. 578 (App. 1983) (defines proof required to establish residual earning capacity and suitability/availability of work)
- Department of Public Safety v. Industrial Commission, 176 Ariz. 318 (1993) (loss of earning capacity compensable only if injury contributes to inability to find suitable work)
- Post v. Industrial Commission, 160 Ariz. 4 (1989) (ALJ must include findings on material issues; appellate court will set aside award if factual basis is unclear)
- Olszewski v. Industrial Commission, 113 Ariz. 282 (1976) (employee released to regular work was ineligible where wage loss was not attributable to injury)
- Pennell v. Industrial Commission, 152 Ariz. 276 (App. 1987) (post‑injury earnings reflect general employability, not only pre‑injury occupation)
- Fullen v. Industrial Commission, 122 Ariz. 425 (1979) (Act protects injured workers and compensates valid claims)
- Cavco Industries v. Industrial Commission, 129 Ariz. 429 (1981) (ALJ must resolve primary issues to permit meaningful appellate review)
- Bell v. Industrial Commission, 236 Ariz. 478 (2015) (statutory language is applied according to plain meaning; related provisions should be construed together)