We granted review to examine the need for and degree of specificity in findings and awards required in workers’ compensation cases. See Rule 23(c), Ariz.R.Civ.App.P., 17B A.R.S. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const, art. 6, § 5(3); A.R.S. §§ 12-120.24 and 23-948, and Rule 10, Ariz.R.P. Spec.Act, 17B A.R.S.
FACTS
On June 3, 1982, Elwood C. Post (Post) suffered a work-related back injury at Holsum Bakery. Argonaut Insurance Company (Argonaut), the bakery’s compensation carrier, acknowledged Post’s injury as work-related and accepted his claim. Argonaut referred Post to James D. Alway, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, in May 1984. Post continued treatment for his injury until February 7, 1985, when Dr. Alway, in a group consultation, found his condition stationary, though Post still suffered from dull low-back pain. Based on the medical examinations, Dr. Alway and the other evaluators found “no objective evidence of permanent impairment of function.” Report of Southwest Disability Evaluation Center dated February 7,1985, at 3. Relying on this evaluation, Argonaut terminated benefits by Notice of Claim Status on February 7, 1985.
Post requested an administrative hearing to challenge Argonaut’s termination of benefits and retained counsel. Argonaut made a subsequent award and Post withdrew his Request for Hearing and signed a waiver of rehearing and aрpeal on November 6, 1985.
See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Commission,
In December 1985, Post’s condition allegedly worsened because he was working longer hours and did not have sufficient time to rest his baсk. On December 24, 1985, Post reached forward in his car seat to turn on the headlights and felt his back “go out.” This incident was not work-related. Post again came under Dr. Alway’s care. Dr. Alway requested Argonaut to resume benefits, and on December 31, 1985, Post petitioned Argonaut to reopen his claim pursuаnt to A.R.S. § 23-1061(H). Argonaut denied reopening, and Post requested a hearing.
At the hearing on July 9, 1986, the administrative law judge heard testimony from Dr. Alway and Dr. William P. O’Neill. The judge made no factual findings of consequence, resolved no conflicts in the evidence, and set forth no conclusions applying law to faсt. Instead, after quoting some testimony and citing general principles of workers’ compensation law, he simply set forth the ultimate legal conclusion; he stated that the evidence failed to establish the new, additional, or undiscovered condition necessary for reopening Pоst’s claim. Decision Upon Hearing and Findings Denying Reopening, September 24, 1986. Post requested administrative review of this award under A.R.S. §§ 23-942(D) and 23-943(A) and (B), but the presiding judge affirmed on November 24, 1986.
Post then filed a special action with the court of appeals under Rule 10, Ariz.R.P. Spec.Act., 17B A.R.S., arguing that the court should set аside the award denying *6 reopening because it was so unspecific that an appellate court could not review it and must, therefore, set it aside. Alternatively, he argued that even if the court could review the award, the evidence did not support it. Argonaut countered that thе evidence, notably portions of Dr. O’Neill’s testimony, supported the award. The court of appeals affirmed the award. Post v. Industrial Commission, No. 1 CA-IC 3683 (Ariz.Ct.App. Jan. 21, 1988) (memorandum decision).
DISCUSSION
Under A.R.S. § 23-1061(H),
1
a claimant may reopen his claim and obtain additional benefits when he demonstrates that his previous work-related injury was a cause of a new, additional, or previously undiscovered physical condition.
2
Stainless Specialty Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Commission,
The judge here did not specifically find on either issue. He merely stated the ultimate conclusion that the evidence did not establish that Post had a new condition under the requirements of
Blickenstaff v. Industrial Commission,
Those cases involve situations where the claimant failed to establish а prima facie case. The situation here is quite different. Post produced ample evidence on both relevant issues to support the reopening of his claim. Therefore, the award could mean either of two things: that the judge found that Post had no new condition, or that he found that Post had a new сondition but it was not related to his original work-related injury.
A. New Condition
On the issue of whether Post had a new condition, Dr. Alway, the treating doctor, testified on Post’s behalf. His June 1986 examination of Post showed more restriction of motion, other physical findings, and a generally worsened condition from the February 1985 evаluation, the date when Argonaut terminated benefits. Dr. O’Neill, on the other hand, testified that his July 1986 examination of Post revealed no substantial difference from what he thought the 1985 group evaluation report described. He further stated that Post’s original work-related injury was stationary. Dr. O’Neill did not disagree with Dr. Alway’s findings — only his conclusions. Presumably, then, Dr. O’Neill found physical symptomatology not present in February 1985. Interpreting Dr. O’Neill’s and Dr. Alway’s testimony, Argonaut intimates that Post’s current problems resulted from “degenerative changes” and are not a new condition. Respondent’s Brief at 10-11. We assume this is possible, but the judge mаde no such finding and failed to resolve the conflict in the medical testimony or the inferences from it. The complete lack of findings would require us to review the record, resolve the conflicts in the testimony, draw one of the conflicting inferences, reach one of two ultimate conclusions, as *7 sume that the judge decided the case on the new condition issue, and determine if we could support this result. This is not our role as an appellate court.
B. Causation
The judge made no findings at all on causation. Dr. Alway related Post’s current condition to the original work-related injury, еven though the non-industrial event precipitated the exacerbation. From the record, Dr. O’Neill appears to disagree with Dr. Alway’s conclusions. On causation, however, the judge must find for the claimant unless the claimant’s activities producing the subsequent injury were unreasonable.
O’Donnell v. Industrial Commission,
The court of appeals recognized that the judge’s findings and disposition do not mention causation and that the award did not resolve the questions regarding this issue. Post, memo, decision at 8-9. However, the court independently determined that “Dr. O’Neill’s testimony supports the conclusion [not necessarily the judge’s conclusion] that the claimant’s present condition is not causally related to the previous industrial injury, that Dr. Alway’s opinion as to root irritation is incorrect, and that the claimant’s present complaints can be explained by the car incident [of December 1985].” Id. at 13 (emphasis added). Although some evidence 3 may support the majority’s statement, the judge did not mention the issue or the evidence on it. Nor did he make any finding on causation. We are unwilling to speculate that the judge made “the conclusion” that no causal relationship existed.
C. The Need for Findings
We do not believe judicial review is possible on this record. We must refrain from taking the factfindеr’s role, especially in industrial commission cases.
Bragg v. Industrial Commission,
On both questions, whether Post had a new condition and, if so, whether it related to his original work-related injury, Arizona law required the judge to resolve the confliсting testimony. General administrative procedure law requires that any final decision of an administrative law judge include findings of fact and conclusions of law. A.R.S. § 41-1011. The judge must separately state the findings and conclusions, and the findings “shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statеment of the underlying facts supporting the findings” (emphasis added). Id. 4 Here, the *8 judge merely recited several factual disputes in the testimony. Not only did he not make a “concise and explicit statement,” he made no findings at all. The ultimate finding, that the judge “[cjonsider[ed] the evidence in its entirety,” falls far short of the type of disputе resolution the statute requires for administrative decisions and orders.
Our caselaw also requires specificity in the judge’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. In
Perry v. Industrial Commission,
We distinguish this case from
Pearce Development v. Industrial Commission,
In the present case, however, we are unable to perform the type of judicial review that workers’ compensation cаses require. Normally, we review the record, searching for support for the award, regardless of whether it grants or denies benefits.
University of Arizona v. Industrial Commission,
We note an additional consideration. Because no statutory provision exists for award of present compensation for future problems in workers’ compensation cases, the law provides for reopening as an exception to the ordinary rules of
res judicata. Stainless,
We hold that the Decision Upon Award and Findings Denying Reopening is so lacking in specificity that we cannot review it. Consequently, we vacate the court of. appeals’ decision and set aside the award.
Notes
. A.R.S. § 23-1061(H) provides:
An employee may reopen his claim to secure an increase or rearrangement of compensation or additional benefits by filing with the commission a petition requesting the reopening of his claim upon the basis of new, additional or previously undiscovered temporary or permanent condition, which petition shall be accompanied by a statement from a physician setting forth the physical condition of the employee relating to the claim. The pаyment for such reasonable and necessary medical, hospital and laboratory work expense shall be paid for by the employer or the employer’s insurance carrier if the claim is reopened as provided by law and if such expenses are incurred within fifteen days of the filing of the petition to reopen. No surgical benefits or monetary compensation shall be payable for any period prior to the date of filing of the petition to reopen.
. Post does not claim any previously undiscovered condition. Essentially, he claims an aggravation or exacerbation of his previous injury. Without attempting to deal with the semantics of whether his condition is precisely new, additional, or previously undiscovered, hereafter we refer to it as a "new” condition.
. We note Judge Corcoran’s dissent in the court of appеals and his recognition that Dr. O’Neill’s testimony against Post on the causation issue was speculative. Post, memo, decision at 14.
. As of 1987, A.R.S. § 41-1011 is numbered A.R. S. § 41-1063. See also the general definitional statute, A.R.S. § 41-1001, which states that chapter 41 applies to a commission:
*8 "Agency” means a board, commission, department, officer or other administrative unit of this state, including the agency head and one or more members of the agency head or agency employees or other persons directly or indirectly purporting to act on behalf or under the authority of the agency head, whether created under the constitution of Arizona or by enactment of the legislature. Agency does not include the legislature, the courts or the governor. Agency does not include a political subdivision of this state or any of the administrative units of a political subdivision, but it does include a board, commission, department, officer or other administrative unit created or appointed by joint or concerted action of an agency and one or more political subdivisions of this state or any of their units. To the extent it purports to exercise authority subject to this chapter, an administrative unit otherwise qualifying as an agency must be treated as a separate agency even if the unit is located within or subordinate to another agency.