Lance v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 147

Background

Lance, a Greyhound bus driver, was subject to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1700 and signed a Last Chance Agreement on July 9, 2015 after safety issues.
Lance filed an EEOC charge on August 13, 2015 alleging sex discrimination and retaliation (First Charge); EEOC issued a right-to-sue notice soon after.
Lance alleges a hostile meeting with manager Mark Taylor on September 9, 2015 in which Taylor yelled and threatened termination if Lance incurred another violation.
Lance filed a second EEOC charge on October 8, 2015 alleging retaliation and that he had been taken off the work schedule as of October 3, 2015; EEOC issued a right-to-sue notice for that charge as well.
Lance resigned October 31, 2015, filed this suit December 23, 2015 against Greyhound asserting Title VII discrimination and retaliation, state wrongful termination/constructive discharge claims, and NLRA-based claims including failure to represent and constructive discharge under § 8(a)(3).
The court considered Greyhound’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and denied in part and granted in part, leaving only the retaliation claim tied to the Second Charge.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness of First Charge Title VII claims	Lance treated the two EEOC charges as a single, joint matter and argues later filing should be excused	Greyhound says suit based on First Charge was filed after the 90-day right-to-sue period and is time-barred	Court: Claims from First Charge dismissed as untimely; no equitable tolling shown
Retaliation (Second Charge) — prima facie elements	Lance contends he engaged in protected activity and suffered adverse actions (removed from schedule, suspension, lost pay) after the September meeting	Greyhound says the September meeting was mere verbal hostility and threats without tangible adverse action	Court: Retaliation claim tied to Second Charge survives; allegations (removed from schedule, suspension/loss of pay) suffice by a thin margin to plead materially adverse action and causation
Wrongful termination / constructive discharge (state law)	Lance alleges constructive discharge and public-policy wrongful termination	Greyhound argues these claims are preempted by §301 LMRA and subject to CBA grievance exhaustion	Court: Claims preempted by §301 and dismissed for failure to exhaust CBA grievance procedure
NLRA §8(a)(3) constructive discharge and hybrid/failure-to-represent claim	Lance alleges he was forced to sign Last Chance Agreement without union rep and that union failed to represent him	Greyhound contends NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction and Lance’s hybrid claim lacks factual support	Court: §8(a)(3) constructive discharge claim dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (NLRB); hybrid/failure-to-represent claim dismissed for insufficient factual pleading

Key Cases Cited

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (pro se complaints are held to less stringent pleading standards)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (court need not accept legal conclusions as factual allegations)
Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147 (1984) (presumption about mailing and receipt of EEOC right-to-sue notices)
Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (strict enforcement of Title VII filing deadlines)
Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (90-day period is a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling)
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (retaliation requires materially adverse action that would dissuade a reasonable worker)
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (state-law claims preempted by §301 only when resolution requires interpretation of a CBA)
Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987) (§301 grants federal jurisdiction and uniform federal law for CBA enforcement)