Lance Conn v. Kentucky Parole Board
2020 CA 001495
| Ky. Ct. App. | Apr 21, 2022Background:
- Four Kentucky inmates (Conn, Dewitt, Roberson, Sholler) serving life sentences were given "serve-outs" by the Kentucky Parole Board despite not having LWOP-qualifying aggravators; some had prior deferments and low-risk classifications.
- The inmates sued, arguing the Board lacked statutory authority under HB 463 and KRS to convert parole-eligible life sentences into serve-outs (effectively removing parole eligibility) and sought reinstatement of parole eligibility.
- The Franklin Circuit Court denied the inmates’ summary judgment motion, finding the Board had authority to order serve-outs; the inmates appealed.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed de novo, focusing on KRS 439.340(14) (which allows deferments and expressly excepts life sentences from the 10-year deferment limit) and the plain-language rule of statutory construction.
- The court concluded parole is an executive function and, under existing Kentucky precedent (notably Simmons), the Board may order serve-outs for life sentences without violating separation of powers.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Parole Board has authority to order a serve-out of a life sentence | Board cannot effectively convert a parole-eligible life sentence into LWOP; Legislature sets sentencing and did not authorize this | KRS 439.340 grants the Board discretion over deferments/serve-outs and expressly excepts life sentences from the 10-year deferment cap | Board has authority; statute does not prohibit serve-outs for life sentences; summary judgment denied |
| Whether ordering a serve-out violates separation of powers by encroaching on judicial/legislative sentencing | Serve-outs alter the sentence and intrude on judicial/legislative domain | Granting or denying parole is an executive function; Board action is within statutory authority | No separation-of-powers violation; Board’s action is within executive authority |
| Whether Supreme Court and Kentucky precedent (Graham, McClanahan) prevent Board from serving-out life inmates | Graham and McClanahan show life and LWOP are distinct; Board cannot impose LWOP-like consequences | Those cases do not create a statutory bar here and are distinguishable from this executive parole action | Court distinguished McClanahan and found those cases do not eliminate Board authority |
| Whether Simmons remains controlling after HB 463 and policy changes | Post-HB 463 developments and policy shifts undermine Simmons | Simmons remains binding precedent unless overruled | Simmons remains good law; Board retains power to serve-out parole-eligible life inmates |
Key Cases Cited
- Jones v. Commonwealth, 636 S.W.3d 503 (Ky. 2021) (plain-meaning statutory interpretation governs legislative intent)
- Phon v. Commonwealth, 545 S.W.3d 284 (Ky. 2018) (Legislature sets crimes and punishments; courts implement sentences within statutory ranges)
- McClanahan v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 694 (Ky. 2010) (sentence outside statutory limits is illegal; distinguishable here)
- Simmons v. Commonwealth, 232 S.W.3d 531 (Ky. App. 2007) (parole power is an executive function; Board may order serve-outs)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (constitutional distinction between life and LWOP referenced by parties)
- Beach v. Commonwealth, 927 S.W.2d 826 (Ky. 1996) (statutory-construction principles)
- Abbott v. Chesley, 413 S.W.3d 589 (Ky. 2013) (standards for appellate review of summary-judgment denials)