Lamont v. New Jersey
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 4104
| 3rd Cir. | 2011Background
- Estate administrator filed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging excessive force by troopers in a deadly- force shooting of Eric Quick.
- Troopers shot Quick after he abruptly pulled his right hand from his waistband while holding it near his body; they believed he was drawing a weapon.
- Quick was fleeing during a pursuit; the encounter occurred in woods near Interstate 295 and Route 30 in Bellmawr, NJ, with multiple troopers present.
- Shots were fired for ten seconds, totaling 39 rounds; 18 bullets hit Quick, 11 from behind; Quick had no weapon, only a crack pipe.
- District Court granted summary judgment on qualified immunity, ruling the initial deadly force justified and no triable issue on later excessive force.
- Appeals court reverses in part, holding a jury must decide whether continued firing after the initial threat was excessive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether initial use of deadly force was reasonable | Lamont contends initial force was unlawful given Quick held no weapon. | Troopers reasonably believed Quick drew a gun when he pulled his hand from the waistband. | Initial force reasonable; threat justified |
| Whether continued firing after the initial threat was excessive | Troopers should have stopped firing once threat ceased; continued shooting was unreasonable. | Continued firing was justified given ongoing danger. | There is a triable issue for a jury on excessiveness; qualified immunity may not apply |
| Whether the blood-and-canvas timing and direction of shots supports causation | Evidence suggests unjustified continued fire after a threat diminished, including many bullets from behind. | Firing sequence and angles could reflect ongoing threat and need for defense. | Jury could find excessive force; causation remained contested |
| Whether the district court properly applied qualified immunity standards | Qualified immunity should not shield ongoing unreasonable force. | Right was not clearly established; reasonable officers could believe threat persisted. | Right was clearly established; immunity not applicable if excessive force persisted |
| Whether entering the woods to pursue Quick was a proximate cause of death | Entering woods exposed Quick to deadly force; woods pursuit violated policy. | Entry was a reasonable tactic; superseding cause breaks causation link to entry. | Proximate-cause analysis depends on superseding cause; intrusion not sole cause |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (reasonableness of force judged from officer's perspective at the moment)
- Garner v. County of Los Angeles, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force requires belief in significant threat of death/serious injury)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (two-step qualified-immunity analysis (precludes without clearly established right))
- Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1999) (summary judgment must rely on evidence beyond self-serving officer accounts)
- Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3d 393 (3d Cir. 1995) (superseding cause can interrupt causal chain for §1983 liability)
- Hundley v. District of Columbia, 494 F.3d 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (superseding-cause concept limits liability when suspect acts violently)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (summary-judgment standard; recounting facts from video permissible)
- Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) (seizure via deadly force requires reasonable belief of threat)