186 A.3d 1276
Me.2018Background
- Deborah Lamkin, the maternal grandmother, petitioned under Maine's Grandparents Visitation Act (GVA) seeking visitation (and alternatively referenced primary residence in filings) for her grandchild after mother Corrie limited contact in 2017.
- Child lived with Deborah and her husband for the first two years; thereafter contact was regular but largely intermittent (weekly after-school, most weekends, daycare coverage two days/week) continuing until late 2016.
- Deborah alleged safety concerns about Corrie’s boyfriend (a registered sex offender); Corrie submitted affidavits showing probation officer and therapist oversight and Department involvement, and disputed Deborah’s caretaking claims.
- Trial court granted Corrie’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing, reasoning Deborah had not made a prima facie showing of de facto parentage and therefore lacked standing under the GVA.
- On appeal the majority reviewed both GVA standing and de facto-parent standards, affirmed dismissal: Deborah failed to show the “urgent reason”/sufficient existing relationship under the GVA and, separately, failed to satisfy statutory de facto-parent elements.
- A dissent argued the trial court applied the wrong standard (de facto-parent test) and that, on the proper GVA “extraordinary contact” standard, Deborah’s history of intensive contact warranted at least a plenary hearing or remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Deborah had standing under the GVA (sufficient existing relationship / "urgent reason") | Lamkin: longstanding, regular caretaking and close relationship (co-residence early years, weekly/daycare care, most weekends) created a sufficient existing relationship to permit GVA relief. | Corrie: contact was typical/intermittent grandparent involvement; mother addressed safety concerns; no urgent reason to override parental rights. | Held: No. Court affirmed dismissal—Deborah’s contact was intermittent and did not meet the GVA "urgent reason" / substantial-relationship standing requirement. |
| Whether Deborah could proceed as a putative de facto parent | Lamkin (in later filings): her role was substantially greater than a typical grandparent and equated to a de facto parent. | Corrie: no consistent caretaking, no acceptance/acknowledgment as parent, no acceptance of full permanent parental responsibilities. | Held: No. Record did not satisfy statutory de facto-parent elements; even if considered, de facto standard is more exacting and Deborah failed to meet it. |
| Whether trial court erred by using de facto-parent standard to resolve GVA standing and whether remand is required | Lamkin/dissent: trial court incorrectly applied de facto-parent criteria; on GVA standard ("extraordinary contact") she established standing; remand required for correct analysis. | State/Majority: Although trial court referenced de facto-parenthood, reviewing the record the evidence fails under either GVA or de facto standards; no remand needed. | Held: Majority—no reversible error; affirmed dismissal on both GVA and de facto-parent grounds. Dissent—would remand or hold Deborah has GVA standing. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000) (parents' fundamental right to raise children and GVA "urgent reasons" concept)
- Robichaud v. Pariseau, 820 A.2d 1212 (Me. 2003) (GVA standing requires extraordinary contact; three procedural safeguards)
- Dorr v. Woodard, 140 A.3d 467 (Me. 2016) (discussion of "urgent reason" and limits of GVA standing)
- Davis v. McGuire, 186 A.3d 837 (Me. 2018) (de facto-parent standing requires satisfying statutory elements by preponderance)
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (parental liberty interest in care, custody, and control of children)