662 F.Supp.3d 289
N.D.N.Y.2023Background
- Plaintiff Timothy Lalonde is legally blind and physically disabled; on March 1, 2020 he was involved in a late-night dispute at his property that led to police intervention.
- After an initial de-escalation, multiple Ogdensburg and Saint Lawrence County officers allegedly surrounded, used force on, tased, and handcuffed Lalonde, causing serious injuries (broken wrist and elbow, torn rotator cuff, ear injury, concussion) and delayed medical care; charges were later dismissed.
- Plaintiffs (Timothy and Theresa Lalonde) sued city, county, police chiefs, individual officers, and Does alleging § 1983 claims (excessive force, false arrest/imprisonment, failure to intervene, fabrication of evidence, conspiracy, Monell and supervisory liability), ADA/RA claims, § 1985/1986 claims, and various state-law torts; complaint filed Feb. 18, 2022.
- Defendants (Ogdensburg and Saint Lawrence County groups) moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); they sought dismissal of certain state-law torts, ADA individual-capacity claims, duplicative negligence claims, and challenged conspiracy/Monell/supervisory pleading.
- The court denied most dismissal arguments and permitted discovery: it allowed § 1983 Fourth Amendment excessive-force and false-arrest/false-imprisonment claims, state-law assault/battery, failure-to-intervene, fabrication and conspiracy claims, Monell and supervisory claims, ADA/RA claims against entities/official-capacity defendants (but dismissed ADA/RA against individuals in their individual capacities), § 1985/1986 claims, and non-duplicative negligence and state tort claims; it dismissed negligence to the extent duplicative of false arrest/imprisonment and ADA claims against individual defendants in individual capacity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excessive force / assault & battery / false imprisonment | Lalonde alleges excessive force, assault/battery, false arrest/imprisonment based on coordinated, unnecessary use of force | Defendants contend assault/battery not a separate § 1983 tort (should be treated as excessive force) and that some claims are duplicative | Court: excessive-force § 1983 claims and related state-law assault/battery and false imprisonment claims survive; duplication arguments rejected at this stage |
| Identification / pleading as to which officer did what | Lalonde pleads alternative theories and seeks discovery to identify actors | Defendants say plaintiffs failed to specify which officer committed certain acts | Court: Rule 8(d) permits alternative pleading; plaintiffs may proceed and use discovery to identify individual actors |
| Failure-to-intervene & fabrication of evidence | Plaintiffs allege officers present failed to intervene and others fabricated reports to justify arrests | Defendants argue an officer can't both be a direct perpetrator and a failure-to-intervene defendant; challenge specificity for fabrication claims | Court: Plaintiffs may plead in the alternative; failure-to-intervene and fabrication claims survive for discovery |
| Monell municipal liability | Lalonde alleges policy/custom, inadequate training/supervision and that policymakers knew officers would confront these situations | Defendants argue absence of pattern or prior incidents; say single incident insufficient | Court: Municipal liability plausibly alleged (policy/custom or single-decision/policymaker theory); Monell claims survive at pleading stage |
| § 1983, § 1985(3), § 1986 conspiracy claims | Plaintiffs allege coordinated, non‑spontaneous attack and subsequent cover-up, including disability‑based animus | Defendants say allegations are conclusory and circumstantial; no class‑based animus shown for § 1985(3) | Court: Conspiracy plausibly pleaded by circumstantial allegations; § 1985(3) may proceed because disability can be a protected class and animus is reasonably inferable; § 1986 depends on § 1985 and also survives |
| Supervisory liability (Sheriff Bigwarfe, Chief Westcott) | Plaintiffs allege policymaking responsibility for training/supervision and reckless indifference | Defendants argue lack of particularized allegations tying supervisors to misconduct | Court: Plaintiffs plausibly allege supervisors were policymakers and plead the requisite connection and mens rea; supervisory claims survive |
| ADA / Rehabilitation Act claims | Plaintiffs allege discrimination and failure to provide reasonable accommodations during encounter and booking | Defendants argue ADA/RA does not allow suits against individuals in their individual capacities and that ADA doesn’t cover use-of-force claims | Court: ADA/RA claims dismissed only to extent against individuals in their individual capacities; official-capacity and municipal claims for failure to accommodate survive; ADA claims tied to discrimination/deliberate indifference (not mere inadequate care) permitted |
| State-law intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) / statute of limitations | Plaintiffs say IIED is part of continuing tort and the re-interrogation in April 2021 restarted limitations | Defendants say IIED is time-barred | Court: On Rule 12(b)(6) posture, plaintiffs plausibly invoked continuing violation doctrine; statute-of-limitations defense premature; IIED claims survive now |
| Negligence claims | Plaintiffs pleaded negligence; some allegations overlap with arrest/prosecution conduct | Defendants say negligence cannot substitute for false arrest/false imprisonment claims and must be dismissed | Court: Negligence claims duplicative of false arrest/imprisonment dismissed; other non-duplicative negligence claims may proceed |
| Trespass claim against Officer Wilson | Plaintiffs assert trespass by Wilson | Defendants rely on municipal-act immunities and cases about municipal liability | Court: Valdez and McLean inapposite to an individual trespass claim; trespass claim against Wilson survives pleading challenge |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard for Rule 12(b)(6))
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (conclusory allegations insufficient; pleading must permit plausible inference of liability)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (Fourth Amendment excessive-force objective-reasonableness standard)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires policy, custom, or failure to train/supervise)
- Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (single decision by municipal policymaker can give rise to municipal liability)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (standards for municipal failure-to-train deliberate indifference)
- Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992) (three-prong test for municipal deliberate indifference in training/supervision)
- Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2017) (deliberate indifference standard for pretrial detainees under Fourteenth Amendment)
- Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609 (2d Cir. 2020) (supervisory liability requires personal involvement and elements of underlying constitutional violation)
- LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995) (conspiracy may be shown by tacit understanding; circumstantial evidence can suffice)