Lacy v. City of San Francisco
3:19-cv-02662
N.D. Cal.Oct 5, 2020Background
- On August 3, 2017, Denise Lacy brought her grandson Lamonte Mims to the San Francisco Hall of Justice; Lacy was accompanied by her eight‑year‑old granddaughter D.G.
- Sergeant Maguire arrested Mims and asked Lacy about Mims’ phone and the vehicle she had used to bring him; Maguire said he could get a warrant but it would be lengthy and asked for consent to search the car.
- Lacy opened the car; officers briefly looked through the interior and trunk and took nothing. Officers then requested D.G.’s phone number, called it, and (according to plaintiffs) an officer grabbed D.G.’s phone; officers also obtained a phone from Lacy’s purse after she reached in and handed it over (she alleges after threats of arrest/impound).
- Plaintiffs brought §1983 claims for unlawful searches (vehicle, purse, Mims’ phone) and unlawful seizures (Mims’ phone, D.G.’s phone); they later abandoned Monell and unlawful‑detention claims.
- The court credited plaintiffs’ version for summary‑judgment purposes, granted summary judgment to defendants on the unlawful search claims and on the seizure of Mims’ phone (exigent circumstances), granted summary judgment as to Sergeant Hutchings for D.G.’s phone, but denied summary judgment as to Sergeant Maguire for the alleged seizure of D.G.’s phone.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lawfulness of vehicle search | Lacy says search was coerced/not voluntary | Officers say Lacy consented after being told a warrant would take time | Consent was voluntary under the totality of circumstances; SJ for defendants |
| Search of Lacy’s purse | Lacy alleges officers searched purse | Defendants deny any search of purse | No evidence of a search; SJ for defendants |
| Search of Mims’ phone contents | Plaintiffs assert officers searched phone without warrant | Defendants say no pre‑warrant search occurred | Plaintiff’s vague testimony insufficient to raise fact issue; SJ for defendants |
| Seizure of Mims’ phone | Lacy says phone taken without consent under threat | Defendants invoke exigent‑circumstances/probable cause + later warrant | Exigent circumstances justified warrantless seizure; SJ for defendants |
| Seizure of D.G.’s phone | Plaintiffs say officers seized phone from an 8‑yr‑old without cause | Defendants say phone could be the pinging device and exigency justified brief seizure | No probable cause after officers verified D.G.’s number and phone rang; SJ denied as to Maguire, granted as to Hutchings |
| Qualified immunity (D.G.’s phone) | Right to be free from seizure of unrelated child’s phone was violated | Officers say no clearly established law put them on notice | Right was clearly established that probable cause was required; qualified immunity denied for Maguire |
Key Cases Cited
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (officers generally require a warrant to search digital data on a cell phone)
- United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2012) (probable cause exists where fair probability that evidence will be found based on totality of circumstances)
- Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001) (exigent‑circumstances balancing test for temporary restraints to prevent evidence destruction)
- Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (protecting incriminating evidence from removal/destruction can justify temporary intrusion)
- Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) (consent to search scope determined by what a reasonable person would have understood)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (warrantless searches presumptively unreasonable under Fourth Amendment)
- Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (limits on extending searches under plain‑view doctrine)
- Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011) (exigent circumstances may permit warrantless entry/seizure to prevent imminent destruction of evidence)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (qualified immunity framework — assess constitutional violation and whether right was clearly established)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity: courts have discretion in sequencing the two‑step inquiry)
