L.B.C. v. Forrest County Youth Court
2016-CA-01672-SCT
| Miss. | Nov 30, 2017Background
- In Dec. 2015, 14‑year‑old L.B.C. digitally penetrated two six‑year‑old girls; he admitted to both counts of sexual battery in Forrest County Youth Court.
- The State transferred the initial adult charges to youth court; a neuropsychologist estimated L.B.C. functioned at about age nine.
- The youth court adjudicated L.B.C. delinquent and entered a disposition requiring him to register as a sex offender under Miss. Code Ann. § 45‑33‑25.
- On appeal L.B.C. challenged the registration requirement on four grounds: (1) sexual battery under § 97‑3‑95(1)(d) does not involve force; (2) registration without an individualized dangerousness finding violates due process; (3) his chronological age (14 for three months) and low mental age exempt him; and (4) mandatory registration contravenes youth‑court confidentiality.
- The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed, holding the statute applied and registration was required.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether delinquency under § 97‑3‑95(1)(d) (sexual battery of child <14) involves "use of force" so as to trigger mandatory registration | L.B.C.: conviction under (1)(d) does not require force; therefore § 45‑33‑25(1)(b) does not apply | State: sex crimes against children are per se forceful because a child cannot consent; (1)(d) is strict liability and force is presumed | Held: (1)(d) involves use of force as a matter of law for victims <14; registration required |
| Whether requiring registration without an individualized finding of dangerousness violates due process | L.B.C.: youth court erred by imposing registration absent an individualized threat assessment | State: statutory scheme mandates registration when statutory criteria met; no such argument was raised below | Held: Issue procedurally barred (not raised in youth court); court declined review |
| Whether juveniles with recent 14th birthday or low "mental age" are exempt from registration | L.B.C.: he had been 14 only three months and functioned at mental age nine, invoking due‑process / Eighth Amendment concerns | State: § 45‑33‑25 is mandatory when criteria satisfied; Atkins inapplicable; no conclusive record of intellectual disability | Held: No exemption; registration mandatory and Atkins does not control here |
| Whether mandatory registration violates youth‑court confidentiality | L.B.C.: public sex‑offender registration conflicts with Youth Court Law confidentiality provisions | State: Youth Court Law contains explicit exception making names/addresses of juveniles adjudicated for sex offenses public | Held: No violation; confidentiality exception applies to sex‑offense registrants |
Key Cases Cited
- Burgess v. State, 178 So. 3d 1266 (Miss. 2015) (force is not always an element of sexual battery but framework for analysis)
- Taylor v. State, 122 So. 3d 707 (Miss. 2013) (sex crimes against children are different; child victims cannot consent)
- Bandy v. State, 495 So. 2d 486 (Miss. 1986) (adopting separate standard for violence when victim is a child)
- Phillipson v. State, 943 So. 2d 670 (Miss. 2006) (statutory‑rape analysis: minors legally cannot consent; age is a bar to consent)
- McQueen v. State, 473 So. 2d 971 (Miss. 1985) (force and violence synonymous; any application of force suffices)
- Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (execution of intellectually disabled persons unconstitutional; cited and distinguished)
- Mississippi Methodist Hosp. & Rehab. Ctr., Inc. v. Mississippi Div. of Medicaid, 21 So. 3d 600 (Miss. 2009) (statutory interpretation: court will not construe a plain, unambiguous statute)