Kwame Ajamu v. City of Cleveland
925 F.3d 793
| 6th Cir. | 2019Background
- In 1975 Ricky Jackson, Wiley Bridgeman, and Kwame Ajamu were convicted of murder largely on testimony of a 12–13 year‑old witness, Edward Vernon; they spent decades in prison and some time on death row. Vernon recanted in 2014, saying police coerced his testimony; convictions were later vacated.
- Plaintiffs sued Cleveland police detectives (some deceased) and the City of Cleveland under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ohio law, alleging Brady violations (withholding exculpatory evidence), fabrication of evidence, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and Monell claims against the City; they sought indemnification under Ohio law.
- The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ state indemnification claims on the pleadings, denied leave to substitute estates of deceased officers, and granted summary judgment to the surviving officer (Stoiker) and to the City on Monell claims.
- On appeal the Sixth Circuit reviewed ripeness and survival issues, whether amendment to add estate administrators was futile, Stoiker’s entitlement to summary judgment and qualified immunity on the Brady, fabrication, malicious‑prosecution, and conspiracy claims, and whether Cleveland was liable under Monell (policy and failure‑to‑train theories).
- The Court concluded there was triable evidence that detectives coerced and fabricated Vernon’s statement and withheld exculpatory information; it reversed summary judgment on Brady, fabrication, and malicious‑prosecution claims (against Stoiker), affirmed dismissal of intracorporate conspiracy claims, reversed dismissal of indemnification claims as premature, and reversed denial of substitution to permit amendment to add estate administrators; it also reversed summary judgment on Monell theories (policy and failure to train).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Indemnification under Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07(B) (ripeness) | Indemnification claim may be litigated now; dismissal with prejudice premature | §2744.07(B) only allows employee (tortfeasor) to seek indemnification; Plaintiffs lack standing | Reversed: indemnification claims are not ripe for merits adjudication and dismissal with prejudice was error; should not be decided now because state law unsettled |
| Substitution of estates / survival of §1983 claims | §1983 claims survive tortfeasor death under Ohio personal‑injury survival statute; amendment is not futile | §1983 claims do not survive in Ohio (malicious prosecution and similar claims abate) | Reversed: Crabbs controls — §1983 claims are treated as personal injury and survive under Ohio law; remand to allow substitution; timeliness issues left to district court |
| Stoiker: Brady, fabrication, malicious prosecution, conspiracy (summary judgment & qualified immunity) | Evidence supports that Stoiker was present, helped fabricate/coerce Vernon’s statement, withheld exculpatory information, influenced prosecution; qualified immunity not available | Stoiker lacked involvement/knowledge; no fabrication/ suppression attributable to him; absolute/qualified immunity; intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars conspiracy claim | Court reversed summary judgment as to Brady (withholding), fabrication, and malicious prosecution — reasonable jury could find Stoiker involved and not entitled to qualified immunity; affirmed summary judgment on conspiracy (intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies to §1983 when employees act within scope of employment) |
| Monell liability for City (official policy and failure to train) | GPO 19‑73 and police practice permitted withholding of witness statements; City failed to train officers about Brady; deliberate indifference | GPO 19‑73 and manual do not authorize withholding; officers were trained and Rule 16 required disclosure; no proof City policy caused violations | Reversed: genuine disputes of material fact exist whether GPO 19‑73 (and police practice) permitted Brady violations and whether training was inadequate/deliberately indifferent; summary judgment improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of material exculpatory evidence by the state violates due process)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (nondisclosure of evidence affecting witness credibility is material under Brady)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under §1983 requires a policy, custom, or deliberate indifference)
- Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (clearly established law inquiry does not require a case directly on point)
- Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (use of fabricated evidence violates fundamental notions of justice)
- Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942) (perjured testimony procured by police deprives defendant of constitutional rights)
- Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (§1983 procedural questions borrow state law; treat §1983 claims uniformly)
- Crabbs v. Scott, 880 F.3d 292 (6th Cir. 2018) (all §1983 claims are characterized as personal injury for survival/statute‑of‑limitations purposes)
- Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (official policy may be formal or informal but must reflect deliberate choices by municipality)
- Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (deliberate indifference standard for municipal liability)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (failure to train liability requires deliberate indifference)
- Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (corporate‑entity principle informing intracorporate conspiracy doctrine)