Kuck v. Danaher
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111793
D. Conn.2011Background
- Consolidated actions Goldberg v. Danaher and Kuck v. Danaher involve DPS and Board defendants over Connecticut gun-permit issuance, revocation, and renewal decisions.
- Plaintiffs allege Second Amendment violations and various due process claims stemming from permit revocations, delays in hearings, and renewal procedures.
- Board and DPS statutes govern permit issuance (29-28), revocation (29-32b), and appeal to the Board with de novo review and court appeal rights.
- Board is within DPS for administrative purposes but statute was amended to place it under the Office of Governmental Accountability; decisions are reviewable and subject to mandamus if not complied with.
- Defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and Eleventh Amendment immunity, arguing lack of personal involvement, and qualified/quasi-judicial immunity; court consolidates the actions and issues this memorandum.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutional validity of Section 29-28(b) under Second Amendment | Kuck/Goldberg contend 29-28(b) is vague and enables arbitrary denial. | DPS/Board argue statute rationally related to public safety and the suitability standard is proper. | Statute survives facial vagueness challenge; suitability standard is sufficiently concrete and related to public safety. |
| Second Amendment application to the Connecticut regime and level of scrutiny | Regime impermissibly restricts core home-self-defense rights. | Section 29-28(b) regulates carrying outside the home; strict scrutiny not required. | Court applies intermediate scrutiny; statute reasonably related to important public-safety objective. |
| Procedural due process delay in Board hearings (Count Two) and potential remedies | Backlog caused lengthy delays violating due process; DPS/Governor/Board involvement alleged. | Backlog stems from Board discretion; DPS not directly responsible for scheduling. | Count Two survives against certain board-related actors; discovery permitted; Eleventh Amendment/Ex parte Young issues addressed later. |
| West Count Three/Seven—due process and Fourth Amendment liability on DPS actions | DPS revoked without proper investigation or contrary to statutory requirements; GPD involvement disputed. | DPS acted within statutory framework; Board/officials may be immune in some capacities. | Count Three and Count Seven viable against DPS individuals; official-capacity claims limited by Eleventh Amendment; Ex parte Young considerations allowed for prospective relief against proper officials. |
| First Amendment retaliation (Count Six) and due process of reinstatement (Count Four) | Retaliation for media statements; improper reinstatement timing alleged. | Speech occurred after initial revocation; no causal link shown; reinstatement timing not compelled. | Count Six dismissed; Count Four dismissed as lack of statutorily mandated reinstatement pathway. |
Key Cases Cited
- Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizes core Second Amendment right to self-defense but not universal scrutiny level)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (incorporates Second Amendment right against the states)
- United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir.2010) (applies intermediate scrutiny to certain gun regulations)
- United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir.2011) (supports intermediate scrutiny for outside-home firearm regulations)
- Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776 (9th Cir.2011) (adopts substantial-burden approach in some firearm-regulation scrutiny)
- Kuck v. Danaher, 600 F.3d 159 (2d Cir.2010) (Second Circuit on due-process delay and public-safety interest in firearms permits)
- Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732 (2d Cir.2010) (discusses facial vagueness challenges and First Amendment sensitivity)
- Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (no set-of-circumstances standard for vagueness outside First Amendment context)
- Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (facilitates Salerno-style vagueness scrutiny outside First Amendment context)
- Rybicki v. City of New York, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.2003) (discusses Morales approach to vagueness outside First Amendment context)
- Morales v. City of Chicago, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (morales approach to facial vagueness has limited majority support; not controlling here)
- Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40 (2d Cir.2002) (premised on due-process timing concerns for seizure/forfeiture)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard; plausibility required)