Ksadd, Llc v. Joan Williams
05-15-00776-CV
| Tex. App. | Oct 23, 2015Background
- Joan Williams was injured when automatic entrance doors at a clinic allegedly malfunctioned and struck her while she was on the premises to pick up a friend after outpatient surgery. She was not a patient and testified she had not received any post-op instructions or been asked to assist with care before the injury.
- Defendants included KSADD, L.L.C. (a landlord/affiliate of the treating physician) and other healthcare-related entities; Williams nonsuited other defendants and proceeded against KSADD.
- KSADD moved to dismiss under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351, arguing Williams’s claim was a health care liability claim (HCLC) subject to the medical expert report requirement; KSADD relied on safety-standards theories and regulatory/credentialing materials.
- At a recorded June 1 hearing the trial court denied KSADD’s motion to dismiss and entered a written order concluding Chapter 74 did not apply; KSADD filed an interlocutory appeal under § 51.014(a)(9).
- Williams’ appellee brief argues (1) Ross v. St. Luke’s controls: a safety-standards HCLC requires a substantive nexus to provision of health care, which is absent here; (2) KSADD failed to admit evidence at the dismissal hearing and improperly relies on out-of-record materials; (3) there is no presumption converting her premises-liability claim into an HCLC as against a non‑provider landlord/affiliate in these facts.
Issues
| Issue | Williams' Argument | KSADD's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Williams’ door-injury claim is a health care liability claim requiring an expert report | Williams: No — the injury occurred at an entrance to pick up a friend, she was not seeking/receiving/assisting in care and the door was not healthcare‑specific; no substantive nexus under Ross | KSADD: Yes — Williams was the designated "responsible adult," assisting in patient discharge; Ross factors and regulations show a substantive connection to provision of care | Trial court denied KSADD’s motion to dismiss; Williams asks this Court to affirm (interlocutory appeal pending) |
| Whether a presumption converts a claim against a physician-affiliate into an HCLC absent evidence of healthcare nexus | Williams: No — Loaisiga’s rebuttable presumption is not applicable where defendant is a landlord/affiliate that did not provide hands-on care and where no nexus is shown | KSADD: Loaisiga and Ross support treating claims implicating conduct during patient care as HCLCs; presumption applies here because of the responsible-adult/discharge context | Trial court found no presumption dispositive here; Williams emphasizes that presumption was inapt on these facts |
| Whether safety standards/regulations and expert materials cited by KSADD may be considered on interlocutory review | Williams: Much of KSADD’s cited materials (regulations, accreditation guidelines, affidavits, hearsay) were not admitted at the dismissal hearing and are dehors the record and should be disregarded | KSADD: Relies on those materials to show the doors and policies implicated patient safety and regulatory duties | Record shows KSADD filed affidavits and materials but did not formally offer/admit them at hearing; Williams argues appellate review must be confined to evidence properly admitted below |
| Whether KSADD met its burden to prove the claim has a substantive relationship to the provision of health care | Williams: KSADD failed to introduce admissible evidence showing the doors were healthcare‑specific or that Williams was providing/assisting care when injured; Ross factors each weigh against HCLC status | KSADD: Points to Ross factors, facility policies, and design/configuration of doors as showing nexus to patient safety/discharge duties | Trial court concluded KSADD did not meet its burden; Williams requests summary affirmance and argues appeal is dilatory |
Key Cases Cited
- Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496 (Tex. 2015) (safety-standards HCLC requires a substantive nexus to provision of medical or health care)
- Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. 2012) (TMLA creates a rebuttable presumption that claims against providers implicating conduct during patient care are HCLCs)
- Scoresby v. Santillan, 346 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. 2011) (purpose of expert-report requirement is to deter frivolous malpractice claims without unduly restricting meritorious suits)
- Garland Cmty. Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d 541 (Tex. 2004) (hospital credentialing claims can be part of health care provision when centered on medical treatment)
- Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2005) (distinguishing contexts where filed materials may be considered on special-appearance-type motions)
- In re Zimmer, Inc., 451 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014) (orig. pro.) (appellate review limited to what the trial court relied upon and admitted when ruling)