Krystal Johnson v. Jesse Quattlebaum, 664 F. App'x 290

Krystal Johnson was arrested after allegedly shouting an expletive within ~50–60 yards of a church; Officer Jesse Quattlebaum prosecuted under S.C. Code § 16-17-530(b) (prohibiting "obscene or profane language" in public places or within hearing distance of a schoolhouse or church).
At municipal trial the court granted a directed verdict for Johnson, finding her speech did not qualify as "profane language" under the statute.
Johnson filed suit in federal court alleging the statute is facially overbroad and unconstitutionally vague (Count IV) and sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the prosecuting officer and the state attorney general.
The district court dismissed Count IV and denied Johnson summary judgment, holding the statute was not facially overbroad or vague.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered whether South Carolina case law (notably City of Landrum v. Sarratt) construes the statute to reach only unprotected fighting words and whether the statute gives adequate notice and limits enforcement discretion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 16-17-530(b) is facially overbroad under the First Amendment	Johnson: statute criminalizes protected profanity and thus reaches a substantial amount of protected speech	Defendants: state appellate construction (Sarratt) narrows the statute to fighting words, which are unprotected	Court: statute construed by Sarratt limits prosecutions to fighting words; not overbroad
Whether § 16-17-530(b) is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause	Johnson: terms like "profane language" and "hearing distance" are vague and invite arbitrary enforcement; legislature could specify distance or require scienter	Defendants: Sarratt narrows "profane" to fighting words; "hearing distance" provides workable proximity limit and need not specify exact feet or additional scienter	Court: not unconstitutionally vague—ordinary people and officers get fair notice and enforcement is sufficiently constrained

United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (overbreadth framework for statutes affecting speech)
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (federal courts should adopt state high court's interpretation of state statute)
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (consider intermediate appellate construction where state supreme court precedent lacking)
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (facial vagueness/overbreadth principles)
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (fighting words doctrine—unprotected category of speech)
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (terms like "near" or proximity need not specify exact distance to survive vagueness challenge)
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (vagueness and enforcement discretion principles)
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (notice and scienter considerations in speech regulation)