Kruszynski v. Kruszynski
2013 Ohio 3355
Ohio Ct. App.2013Background
- Kruszynski appeals a civil stalking protection order (CSPO) granted against him in favor of Amy Kruszynski after a two-day hearing.
- Appellant and appellee married in 2002 and separated by end of 2008; divorce proceedings were stayed due to Appellant’s bankruptcy.
- Amy filed Sept. 14, 2012 for CSPO on behalf of herself, their son, and her boyfriend; an ex parte order issued.
- Hearing Sept. 26 and Oct. 5, 2012 produced conflicting testimony about several incidents including erratic driving, tailgating, insults, and threats.
- The trial court granted the CSPO as to Amy but denied it as to the son and the boyfriend; the court found a pattern of conduct and credibly supported emotional/physical harm concerns.
- Appellant argues there was no two-or-more-incident pattern closely related in time; he notes some alleged incidents occurred months before the petition and there was a gap before the hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the CSPO was properly issued under R.C. 2903.214 | Kruszynski contends no pattern of conduct existed | Kruszynski argues incidents were not a pattern or close in time | CSPO affirmed; court found a pattern and sufficient evidence of fear/mental distress |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Scruggs, 136 Ohio App.3d 631 (2000) (pattern of conduct may include two or more events closely related in time)
- Middletown v. Jones, 167 Ohio App.3d 679 (2006) (totality of circumstances determines closeness in time)
- Dario, 106 Ohio App.3d 232 (1995) (case-by-case determination of proximity in time)
- Coleridge v. Tomsho, 2003-Ohio-650 (5th Dist. Stark) (R.C. 2903.211 disjunctive standard for fear of harm or distress)
- Olenik v. Huff, 2003-Ohio-4621 (5th Dist. Ashland) (abuse of discretion standard for protection orders)
- C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Construction Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279 (1978) (substantial evidence standard; weight of evidence)
- Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (1983) (abuse of discretion standard; deference to trial court)
