173 Conn. App. 539
Conn. App. Ct.2017Background
- Plaintiff (cardiologist) and defendant (psychiatrist) are divorced parents; their 4‑year‑old son made allegations of sexual abuse against plaintiff in Feb 2011.
- Defendant relayed the child’s allegations to the child’s therapist and to Department of Children and Families (DCF) and Yale Child Sexual Abuse Clinic personnel; DCF investigated and closed the matter as unsubstantiated.
- Plaintiff sued defendant (Feb 2013) alleging vexatious litigation, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress based on the statements to DCF/Yale Clinic.
- Defendant moved for summary judgment asserting absolute immunity under the common‑law litigation (quasi‑judicial) privilege; trial court denied the motion, concluding statutory §17a‑101e provides only qualified (good‑faith) immunity and thereby abrogates any common‑law absolute immunity.
- Defendant appealed only the denial as to absolute immunity; the appellate court assumed, without deciding, that DCF investigations are quasi‑judicial and that the statements were made in that context but held §17a‑101e abrogates any common‑law absolute immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendant is entitled to common‑law absolute immunity (litigation privilege) for reports to DCF/Yale Clinic | DCF reports should not get absolute immunity; public policy disfavors immunity for false reports | Absolute immunity required to encourage free reporting in quasi‑judicial proceedings, including DCF investigations | Not entitled to absolute immunity; statute §17a‑101e provides only qualified immunity and abrogates any common‑law absolute immunity |
| Whether §17a‑101e implicitly abrogates common‑law absolute immunity | §17a‑101e expresses only qualified immunity, so plaintiff argues it limits protection | Legislature did not expressly abrogate common law; abrogation should be explicit | §17a‑101e conditions immunity on good faith (qualified) and thus, like similar statutes, implicitly abrogates common‑law absolute immunity |
| Whether statements to Yale Clinic (not DCF employees) fall within §17a‑101e | Plaintiff limits claims to statements to DCF/Yale Clinic; statute covers reports made to DCF and its investigation agents | Defendant contends Yale Clinic not DCF agent so privilege applies | In these limited circumstances (interview at DCF request during DCF investigation), statements to Yale Clinic counted as reports within §17a‑101e |
| Whether criminal penalties for false reports are inconsistent with recognizing absolute civil immunity | N/A | Absolute civil immunity would be inconsistent with penalizing knowingly false reports | Criminal penalties reinforce legislative choice to permit civil liability for bad‑faith/false reports; supports statutory abrogation of absolute immunity |
Key Cases Cited
- MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616 (discussion of litigation privilege and policy justifications for absolute immunity)
- Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hosp., 272 Conn. 776 (legislature can implicitly abrogate common‑law absolute immunity; statutes providing good‑faith immunity are qualified and displace absolute immunity)
- Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549 (definition and scope of quasi‑judicial proceedings for privilege analysis)
- Mercer v. Blanchette, 133 Conn. App. 84 (generous relevancy test for statements to qualify for litigation privilege)
- Gallo v. Barile, 284 Conn. 459 (declining absolute privilege for reports to law enforcement; harms from false reports and resource diversion)
- Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821 (inconsistency of criminalizing false reports while granting absolute civil immunity)
- Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410 (definition of "report" and that §17a‑101e applies to secondary reporters)